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Victor John Paolone
University of Windsor

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NDP-LABOUR RELATIONS: CRISES AND CHALLENGES IN THE 1990s

by

Victor J. Paolone

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ABSTRACT

The following study examines the NDP's relationship with labour. Historically, NDP labour relations have been tenuous at best. In the 1990s, however, this relationship has been seriously threatened. The aim of this study is to probe into how NDP- labour relations have functioned in the past, and how they might evolve in the future. The first chapter reviews CCF-NDP relations with labour from 1932 to 1988. This is followed by a literature review designed to provide the necessary background on NDP-labour relations. Chapter three looks at the nature of NDP-labour relations and their impact on the NDP's electoral fortunes in the 1993 federal election campaign. The fourth chapter examines how NDP-labour relations have evolved following the 1993 federal election. As well, included in this chapter is an alternative structural model for the NDP designed to not only strengthen NDP-labour relations, but to also increase the party's electoral competitiveness. Finally, chapter five summarizes the study's main points and arguments.

DEDICATION

This paper is dedicated to my parents, whose support and encouragement kept me sane during difficult times.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	iii
Dedication	iv
Acknowledgements	v
Introduction	1
Chapter One: NDP-Labour Relations, 1932-1988	6
Social Democracy in Canada	9
The Labour Movement in Canada: 1932-1940	12
CCF-Labour Relations: 1940-1945	17
The Transition from CCF to NDP: 1946-1962	22
The Unionism of the 1950s	25
The Founding of the New Democratic Party	27
NDP-Labour Relations: 1963-1988	33
The Transformation of Labour in Canada	40
Conclusion	43
Chapter Two: Literature Review	52
The Political Party: A Theoretical Perspective	53
Party Structure	56
Party Leadership	62
The NDP in Quebec: Le Neant	64
Ideology and the NDP	66
The NDP's Relationship With Labour	72
Conclusion	86
Chapter Three: The 1993 Federal Election	95
Voting Behaviour	97
The 1993 Election Campaign	105
Conclusion	116
Chapter Four: NDP-Labour Relations After 1993	121
The Social Contract: The NDP-Labour Relationship in Crisis	122
The 1995 Ontario Provincial Election	128
A Formula For Success: The NDP in Saskatchewan	133
NDP-Labour Relations: British Columbia	135
The Future of NDP-Labour Relations	137
Conclusion	151
Chapter Five: Conclusion	159
Bibliography	165
Vita Auctoris	

NDP-LABOUR RELATIONS: CRISES AND CHALLENGES IN THE 1990s

INTRODUCTION

The electoral setback suffered by the NDP during the 1993 federal election has forced the party to re-examine its relationship with organized labour. Labour, too, has felt compelled to re-evaluate its relationship with the NDP. Most social democratic parties have close ties with labour. The central premise of this study, however, that a similar relationship in Canada has not been as strong; and in the 1990s it is under attack. From a topical standpoint, this study identifies and analyzes the problems which have historically plagued NDP-labour relations.

The first chapter of this study looks at the evolutionary development of CCF-NDP relations with organized labour between 1932-1988. This chapter presents data on CCF-NDP electoral fortunes and reviews the financial and electoral support that labour has given to the party. It also includes data which lists the numbers of union locals affiliated to the NDP as well as the rules outlining union affiliation.

The second chapter is a review of the literature from 1988 to 1995. The literature reviewed comes from various books, newspapers, labour discussion papers, and NDP renewal conference material. In addition to revealing material regarding NDP-labour relations, this chapter includes material which probes into such topics as party leadership,

the NDP in Quebec, party structure, and how New Democrats define themselves and their role within the NDP. In addition to exposing the relevant issues which have shaped the nature of NDP-labour relations, this chapter also looks at the issues which have caused intra-party conflict and NDP-labour strife.

Chapter three examines NDP-labour relations during the 1993 federal election campaign. Specifically, it looks at the reasons responsible for NDP-labour tensions during the federal election campaign. As an important background, this chapter includes a discussion of the various factors which have influenced voting behaviour in Canada. Additionally, it compares the political attitudes of union voters to union leaders to shed light on why so few trade unionists voted for the NDP in 1993.

The fourth chapter examines and evaluates, in detail, one of the root causes for NDP-labour tensions - the Ontario NDP government's Social Contract Act (Bill 48). In addition, this chapter examines the records of provincial NDP governments which have governed in Canada during the 1990s. Lastly, this chapter uses the transaction theory as an aid in producing an alternative structural model for the NDP. The transaction theory facilitates in the understanding of the factors which have influenced NDP-labour relations during the 1990s. Ralph Goldman contends that the main premise behind the transaction theory is that

"when persons contribute effort and action to an organized group, they are giving something in the expectation of receiving something else..."(1) Not only do both parties have to profit from an exchange, a high degree of trust towards each other is also required in order to carry out a successful transaction.

The political transactions which occur between parties, called currencies, are divided into three categories: Shares (decisional elements); incumbencies (positional elements); and commodities (materiel exchanges). Decisional elements refer to an individual's influence within the decision making process of an organization.(2) Positional elements describe when individuals contribute to a group with the expectation of personal reward in return, for instance, job patronage as a reward for party service.(3) Finally, materiel exchanges describe the exchange of materials, most notably money, as an instrument for achieving an individual's goals.(4)

It will be argued that by implementing structural changes the NDP can create a party in which the channels of communication between it and labour are enhanced. As a result, trust will be restored, both parties will profit from exchanges, and successful transactions will take place. By creating an environment which encourages transactions to occur, cooperation between the NDP and labour will be expanded, conflict reduced, and political integration

enhanced. Therefore, the transaction theory can help to explain why NDP-labour relations have been tenuous and controversial in the past and how they can be improved upon, through structural changes, in the future.

The fifth, and final, chapter includes a brief review of all key concepts and issues as they pertain to NDP-labour relations. This chapter will also reiterate the main arguments of the study.

The following chapters will clearly show why NDP-labour strife is detrimental to the interests of both organizations. In order to survive as a credible political entity, the NDP must have labour's endorsement, its foot soldiers, and its financial contributions. Furthermore, the labour movement, particularly those unions most unhappy with the NDP (the Canadian Auto Workers and most public sector unions), should not abandon the party or divert their resources to extra-parliamentary social coalitions. To follow such an approach would only lesson labour's effectiveness to influence public policy.

ENDNOTES

1. Ralph M. Goldman, *Contemporary Perspectives On Politics* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1972),p.128.

2. Ibid., p.128.

3. Ibid., p.153.

4. Ibid., p.154.

CCF-NDP RELATIONS WITH LABOUR: 1932-1988

CHAPTER ONE

This chapter will examine CCF-NDP relations with organized labour from 1932 to 1988. It will be argued that the party's leadership saw trade union support, specifically in Ontario, as necessary to expand beyond its western base of support. However, the voting behaviour of union members is only one of many factors which must be considered. The number of local unions affiliated to the NDP and labour's financial contributions to the party are also important.

Historically, less than encouraging results at the ballot box have been interpreted a number of different ways. Positions in the trade unions and the party range from severing ties at one extreme, to strengthening ties at the other. The controversy surrounding this debate has persisted within the union movement and the party since the 1930s. By contrast, most social democratic parties in other countries have enjoyed stronger and more harmonious relations with their labour allies. What, then, are the factors which make social democracy unique in Canada? To answer this question, this chapter will include comparisons between the CCF-NDP and the British Labour party.

The trade union movement in Canada must also be examined carefully. Trade unionists have long held differing views with regard to their role in politics. The

organizational structure of the trade union movement will also be reviewed. This is necessary because it will further illustrate that organized labour is not a monolithic entity. According to Freeman and Medoff: "Trade Unions are the principal institutions of workers in modern capitalist societies."(1) Although this definition is accepted, it will be clearly shown that these institutions differ substantially from one another. Specifically, divisions between industrial and craft unions during the thirties and forties, and tensions between national and international unions during the sixties and seventies will be discussed. It is these differences within the labour movement that have shaped labour's sometimes controversial relationship with the CCF and its successor, the NDP.

To discuss these issues in a clear and concise manner, this chapter will be divided into three parts. Part one will focus on organized labour's relationship with the party from 1932 to 1945. Moreover, it is here where social democracy will be defined and how it has been able to find its place in Canadian politics. This is also a period where the CCF leadership attempted to obtain labour's support in Central Canada. As for the trade union movement in Canada, historically it has been seriously divided on the issue of direct political action. These divisions will be uncovered and analyzed. This chapter will also explain why the 1943 endorsement of the CCF by the Canadian Congress of Labour

(CCL) as the "political arm of labour,"(2) failed to result in electoral gains for the party in Canada's industrial heartland. Finally, the influence of the Communist party within the trade union movement and its impact during the 1945 federal election will be discussed.

Part two of this chapter will cover the period from 1946 to 1962. Emphasis will be placed on the CCF's gradual shift away from socialism, as described in the Regina Manifesto, towards the more politically moderate Winnipeg Declaration of Principles in 1956. It will be argued that through moderation the CCF hoped to gain greater union support. As well, during this period significant changes within the trade union movement directly influenced party-labour relations. The merger between the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) and the CCL helped unify labour's voice in Canada. Furthermore, the growing numbers of unionized workers during this period led to a more confident and politically active labour movement. It is these changes, both within the party and the labour movement, which made it possible for the founding of the New Democratic party in 1961.

Finally, Part three will review the NDP's relationship with labour from 1963 to 1988. This section will include statistical information on NDP electoral fortunes, with particular attention given to the voting behaviour of trade unionists. Moreover, the question of whether or not the

transformation of the CCF into the NDP has benefitted the party will be discussed. This section ends at 1988 because it was during this period when serious cracks first appeared between labour and the party over electoral strategy. Many prominent trade unionists criticized the NDP for not focussing on the Free Trade debate. Additionally, it will be shown that during this period formal ties between the NDP and labour, by way of affiliation, have made up only a small percentage of Canada's total union membership. Furthermore, these trade unionists have not been shown to favour the NDP over the Liberals or Conservatives during election time.

Part 1.

Social Democracy In Canada

In 1932 the decision to create the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was taken. The following year at its first National Convention, the CCF adopted the Regina Manifesto, which outlined the party's principles and objectives. The Regina Manifesto was intended to offer Canadians something radically different from what the two traditional parties had been offering. The founders of the CCF believed that the Depression demonstrated that capitalism had failed. They proposed "The establishment of a planned, socialized economic order, in order to make possible the most efficient development of the natural resources and the most equitable distribution of the

national income."(3). The membership of the CCF consisted of various farmer, labour and socialist groups. These groups were united in their belief that changes were necessary to reverse the human misery caused by the Depression.

When compared to social democratic parties in other English-speaking countries, the CCF was certainly unique. Its Manifesto was far more radical than the British Labour Party's. For example, the final paragraph of the Regina Manifesto states: "No CCF Government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to the establishment in Canada of the Co-operative Commonwealth."(4) By contrast, the British Labour party did not fully support socialism nor did it recognize the class struggle as the motor of social change.(5) Referring to the British labour movement, Henry Pelling contends that "...the comparative prosperity of the employed workers in the late nineteenth century limited the success of the Socialists' appeal."(6) Moreover, as the name would suggest, the British Labour Party (BLP) was heavily influenced by the British trade unions. It was labourism that had influenced the creation of the BLP. Labourism, unlike socialism, was concerned with the improvement of life for the working class rather than replacing capitalism with socialism.(7)

There are two reasons why social democracy evolved

differently in Canada than in Great Britain. First, Canada during the 1930s, was mainly a rural and agrarian country. Less than 15 percent of the country's urban workforce was unionized.(8) Therefore, the creation of a major national labour party in Canada was not a realistic objective. Second, the trade union movement was fragmented and, for the most part, uninterested in involving itself with politics. For example, the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLC), the largest union organization in the country during the 1930s, followed in the traditions of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), choosing to remain "...independent of any political organization"(9) Thus, a lack of political interest within the labour movement, combined with a small unionized workforce, differentiated Canadian social democracy from that of Great Britain.

At first, the mainly rural roots of the CCF rendered it irrelevant in Canada's industrial heartland. Participating in its first federal election in 1935, the CCF won only seven seats.(10) Moreover, the party failed to win a single seat east of Manitoba. In fact, the CCF ran no candidates in the Maritimes and obtained only eight percent of the popular vote in Ontario and less than one percent of the popular vote in Quebec.(11) The CCF leadership realized that more had to be done in order to obtain trade union support. The major problem facing the CCF was that there were no formal rules for trade unions to affiliate with the

party. The CCF's leadership understood that the party was a coalition of various interests. If rules for union affiliation were established, then it was important that they not allow labour to gain a dominant position within the party. The CCF was forced to deal with this issue when on August 15th, 1938 District 26 of the United Mine Workers (UMW) voted to affiliate with the party.(12) To prevent the possibility of eventual union domination, the party allowed affiliation to occur only at the local union level. As well, the rules outlining union representation were designed to severely limit labour's voice within the party. Instead of following the practices of the British Labour party which allowed block voting and block representation, the CCF formulated a system that gave unions less representation per capita than their constituency organizations.(13) As a result, union representation within the CCF and its successor, the NDP, was always limited whereas within the BLP trade union membership was dominant.(14) Thus, union support was desired by the CCF. However, union control was not.

The Labour Movement in Canada: 1932-1940

Formal ties by way of affiliation between labour and the CCF were, for the most part, non-existent during this period. There was very little incentive to affiliate with the CCF. The party appeared a long way from becoming a

significant political force in Canada. Why, then, would a trade union local want to support and financially contribute to a party that had little chance of being elected? By affiliating with the CCF some trade unionists feared that their ability to lobby the traditional parties would be damaged. Therefore, many union leaders believed that affiliation would hinder labour's interests rather than advance them. To better understand this issue it is necessary to review the developments occurring within the trade union movement during this period.

In Canada there were two opposing philosophies that emerged within the labour movement during the 1930s.(15) The first paralleled closely with the politically active role that trade unions played in Britain. This perspective was imported to Canada by British immigrants. These immigrants were able to influence the trade union movement in Canada because they were not considered as foreigners in English-speaking Canada. According to Gad Horowitz, their political views were accepted because English Canada's political culture already contained non-liberal elements, such as toryism, within it.(16) The second view to emerge was modelled after the American example which followed the Gomperist approach of political non-alignment. Samuel Gompers, a prominent American labour leader, believed that labour should not support certain political parties over others. Rather, he believed that labour should support only

those individual politicians who would advance labour's wishes. While the smaller All-Canadian Congress of Labour (ACCL) followed the former philosophy, the TLC favoured the latter.

Complicating matters for the CCF was the fact that the two organizations were bitter rivals. The ACCL, after all, was established by a number of unions that were expelled from the TLC. The animosity between the two groups was public and well understood by the leaders of the CCF. The CCF, therefore, attempted to cautiously build a relationship with the ACCL without isolating the much larger TLC.

The second, and more serious, problem facing the CCF came from the Communist Party. Although the CCF's constitution prohibited the admission of individuals belonging to another party, it feared Communist infiltration through trade union affiliation. This concern was well founded. Since the 1920s the Communists were actively organizing workers. Communist Party members created the Workers Unity League (WUL) which brought an estimated 25,000 unorganized workers into industrial unions by 1935.(17) By organizing workers, the Communists attempted to gain a prominent voice within the Canadian trade union movement. To successfully achieve this objective, WUL activists, on instructions from the Communist party, began merging their unions into the AFL.(18)

The CCF, and its sympathizers within the labour

movement, were also organizing workers. Not surprisingly, the Communists and the CCF soon became intense rivals, as both political organizations claimed to be the party best suited to represent labour's interests. In the United States, the AFL grew increasingly concerned over the growth and political orientation of these newer industrial unions. After suspending them for one year, the AFL expelled these organizations entirely in 1937.(19) The expelled unions then created their own organization independent from the AFL called the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The rift between the AFL and some of its industrial unions soon spilled over into Canada. Following their decision in the United States, the AFL successfully pressured their Canadian affiliate, the TLC, to expel all CIO unions from its organization as well.

By the beginning of 1940, the CIO unions and the ACCL began holding meetings over the possibility of a merger between the two organizations. From these meetings came an eventual agreement to create the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL). The new Congress elected a prominent Canadian labour union leader, Aaron Mosher, as its first president.(20) The election of Mosher as president of the CCL was expected to have a positive impact on CCF-Labour relations. In 1932, Mosher attended the Calgary Conference as the president of the Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees. It was here where Mosher, along with various other farmer, labour and

socialist groups announced the founding of the CCF. Thus, there was no secret where the loyalties of the CCL's president lay. However, since only union locals, rather than federations or councils could affiliate with the CCF, Mosher's role, and the impact of other CCF members within the CCL executive, was limited. In other words, the CCL did not have the authority to command its members to affiliate with the CCF. Additionally, many of the former CIO unions were Communist led or influenced. These unions were not only unsympathetic towards the CCF, they were also the party's most serious political competitors.

Clearly, then, during the latter half of the 1930s there were major changes occurring within the trade union movement. First, there was the growth of industrial unions, which were beginning to rival the size and strength of the older craft unions. Second, Communist influence and involvement within these newer unions posed a direct challenge to the CCF in their drive to secure labour's support. Finally, despite the efforts made by the CCF to gain trade union support, only one union, UMW District 26, affiliated with the CCF by 1940.

The party's failure to attract trade union support was reflected in the 1940 federal election results when it won only eight seats. More serious was the party's showing in Ontario. Not only did the CCF fail to win a seat in Ontario, but it also saw its support slide to 3.8 percent

of the vote, down significantly from the 8 percent showing that it received during the 1935 federal election.(21) Although the CCF's failure to obtain labour's support was not the only factor responsible for its weak showing, the party's leadership nevertheless realized that substantial policy changes were needed to obtain trade union support.

CCF-Labour Relations: 1940-1945

CCF-Labour relations would change dramatically during the war years. Unlike the Depression years of the 1930s when many labour unions were weak and timid, full employment as a result of the war increased the size and the strength of the industrial unions. The CCF also benefited from the war because their message for a larger governmental role in the economy was not considered as radical during the war years as it was during the 1930s. The Liberals, after all, had been intervening and regulating the economy to fulfil Canada's obligations for the war effort. It appeared the CCF's leadership, sensing the opportunity for making serious political gains had materialized, began to modify its message in order to attract the growing middle class and the trade unions.

The CCF's steady rise in the polls produced immediate benefits for the party. Now that the party was considered a political contender, labour appeared to be moving closer to it. Interestingly, the CCL's endorsement of the CCF in

September 1943 occurred at about the same time that a Gallup Poll placed the CCF ahead of both the Liberals and the Conservatives. Increasing popularity combined with the CCL's endorsement led to a substantial rise in the number of unions which chose to affiliate with the CCF. By 1944 the CCF had 100 union locals with approximately 50,000 members affiliated to the party.(22) However, the party's rules outlining union affiliation prevented labour from obtaining a dominant position within the CCF. During the 1944 national convention only 19 out of 208 delegates were from affiliated union locals.(23)

At the CCF's 1944 national convention it soon became clear that the party was not as eager to follow the socialist dogma which dominated the pages of the Regina Manifesto. The CCF's national secretary, David Lewis, was instrumental in steering the party away from its socialist roots. Not all CCFers, however, were happy with the proposed changes. On November 30, 1944 the *Windsor Star* reported: "Manifesto Changes Stir Hot Dispute Between Factions at Convention." The debate was centred around the statement within section six of the 1944 Manifesto regarding the issue of social ownership which read: "The socialization and democratic control, under either public or co-operative ownership, of key industries which are monopolistic in operation..."(24) By this statement the party appeared to be abandoning its commitment to

"eradicate" capitalism. The Manifesto went even further by stating: "The socialization of large-scale enterprise, however, does not mean taking over every private business."(25) Obviously, replacing capitalism with socialism was no longer a stated CCF objective.

While the 1944 Manifesto was threatening to divide the CCF, the CCL supported the more moderate position being conveyed by the party. Labour, for the most part, had always tended to be "more conservative" than the CCF, and consequently the party's changes bridged some of the ideological differences which existed between the two organizations.(26) The majority of Canada's trade unions were not opposed to capitalism as it had existed during this period. The party's overtures to labour, however, did not translate into overwhelming electoral support. The governing Liberals, led by Mackenzie King, took a number of CCF ideas and used them as their own. In 1940, the Liberals passed the Unemployment Insurance Act, and in 1944 they made a key concession to labour when they established by Order-in-Council compulsory bargaining rights.(27) The major advantage that the Liberals had over the CCF was that they were the governing party. In this position the Liberals had the power to demonstrate, with legislative action, their promises whereas the CCF could not. When in 1945 the Liberals called an election many Canadians, including trade unionists, saw no need to take a chance with

an inexperienced group of CCFers when the more experienced Liberals appeared equally committed to implementing many of the same programs.

In addition to the Liberal party, the CCF had the Communist challenge to contend with. As mentioned, there were many Communist-led unions within the CCL. Their opposition to the CCF disrupted the possible development of closer ties between the two organizations. As early as 1940, the Communists attempted to seize control of the CCL executive when at its first national convention Nigel Morgan, the Communist regional director of the CIO in Vancouver, ran against Aaron Mosher for the presidency. Although Mosher did win the election with 283 votes, Morgan still managed to receive the support of 175 delegates.(28) Morgan's defeat, however, did not diminish the Communist presence or influence within the CCL. In the following years, the Communists successfully attacked the credibility of the CCL's newly created Political Action Committees (PAC). The PACs were set up to persuade the rank and file to vote for the CCF. The impact of Communist opposition towards the PACs ultimately hindered their role substantially. Consequently, and unfortunately for the CCF, overt Communist opposition toward the PACs contributed to the party's disappointing electoral performance in 1945.

The Communists went even further in challenging the CCF. Not only were they opposing closer ties between the

CCL and the CCF, they founded a new party called the Labor-Progressive party (LPP) in 1943. The LPP was created to offer trade unionists a political alternative to the CCF. The LPP supported class collaboration, it asked unions to support a no strike pledge, and it promised to support the Liberal government.(29) The LPP's stance was based on the belief that the federal government should be aided in its war effort to defeat fascism. It was the fascist states, after all, which posed the greatest threat to Communism with the German invasion of the Soviet Union. For this reason, the Communist International favoured class collaboration in order to help defeat the Axis powers. The Liberals, for the most part, recognized that there were political advantages associated by allying themselves with the Communists in certain regions. For example, in cities such as Windsor, the Liberal-LPP alliance was desirable because the city's largest union, the United Auto Workers, was sympathetic to the Communists.(30) Consequently, during the 1945 election campaign, the Liberals agreed to allow candidates endorsed by the LPP to run under the Liberal-Labour banner in Windsor.

Thus, as the 1945 federal election campaign was coming to an end, the CCF could not obtain the overwhelming support that it needed from the labour movement. Although the CCL endorsed the CCF as the political arm of labour, few unions ever did affiliate with the party. Furthermore, the

Liberals had skilfully managed to gain the support of most of the TLC and CCL unions shortly before the election.(31) The Liberals were ultimately successful because they made a series of key legislative concessions to organized labour. Moreover, the party's main rival from the left, the Communists, had managed to frustrate the development of closer ties between the CCF and the CCL. During the election campaign the Communists challenged the CCF in many electoral ridings. Not surprisingly, the CCF failed to make the impact its leaders had expected during the initial weeks of the election campaign. The final electoral results on June 11, 1945, revealed that the Liberals had won 125 seats, the Conservatives 67 seats, and the CCF 28 seats.(32) As well, the CCF which had once led in the opinion polls in 1943, received only 15.6 percent of the popular vote in 1945.(33)

Part 2.

The Transition From CCF to NDP: 1946-1962

In many ways, the dramatic changes occurring within Canadian society contributed to the transition of the CCF into the NDP. The end of the Second World War did not lead to a return of the economic conditions of the 1930s, as the CCF had warned. Realizing this, the party was forced to adjust to the economic realities of post-war Canadian society. Although many CCFers were divided over how to make

their party more attractive, one view eventually prevailed. The party bureaucrats believed that a move towards the political centre would make it more attractive to the growing numbers of people who made up the middle-class. As well, the labour movement was also undergoing dramatic changes. The advent of the Cold War led to a major purge of the Communists within the trade unions. Additionally, the labour movement emerged after the war larger and with expectations to expand its membership in the new industrial economy. As a result of these changes, the CCF hoped to establish closer links with organized labour as a way to improve its electoral fortunes.

In a report outlining the CCF's role in Parliament during the 1946 session, it is clear that the party wanted to demonstrate its value to labour. Not surprisingly, missing in this document were any reference to the socialist dogma that dominated CCF material in the past. The party's position on labour issues were discussed in the following manner:

> The 1946 session, like all previous sessions, showed clearly that labour has no voice in Parliament other than its Party, the CCF....In addition to fighting the immediate struggle of labour, the CCF members continued to demand a national labour code to ensure genuine collective bargaining, union security, higher wage levels and improved working conditions.(34)

Thus, despite the CCF's failure to receive a significant level of union support during the 1945 election, it was still prepared to convey a pro-labour image. By the late

1940s many of the obstacles hindering the development of closer ties between the CCF and labour were being removed. The Communists, who had been such formidable foes of the CCF, were now being removed from the unions. Fortunately for the CCF, the Communists had the ill-fortune of being associated with the foreign policies of the Soviet Union.(35) As a result, the CCF was able to fill the void left by the Communists and therefore increase its influence within the CCL.

The continuation of economic prosperity, however, continued to have a negative impact on the electoral fortunes of the CCF. During the 1949 federal election the party won only 13 seats, a decline of 15 seats from 1945.(36) Although winning 23 seats in 1953, the CCF's share of the popular continued to decline. In 1953 the party won 11.3 percent of the popular vote, which was a drop 2.1 percent from 1949.(37) The electoral setbacks suffered by the CCF signalled to the party's leadership that major changes were needed.

The party's national executive drafted and presented to the 1956 convention the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles. Unlike other CCF documents, such as the 1944 Election Manifesto, the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles was significant because it was intended to replace the objectives and principles outlined in the Regina Manifesto. The differences between the two documents were remarkable.

Whereas the Regina Manifesto asserted that "No CCF Government will rest until it has eradicated capitalism..." the final paragraph of the Winnipeg Declaration stated the following:

> The CCF will not rest content until every person in this land and in all other lands is able to enjoy equality and freedom, a sense of human dignity, and an opportunity to live a rich and meaningful life as a citizen of a free and peaceful world.(38)

Apparently, then, the CCF accepted the notion that capitalism could be reformed rather than replaced by socialism. In a style which closely resembled that of the two traditional parties, the Winnipeg Declaration was an ambiguous document. Moreover, it contained little ideological content when compared to its predecessor, the Regina Manifesto.

The Unionism of the 1950s

The CCF's move toward the political centre paralleled closely a series of changes occurring within the labour movement. Labour appeared increasingly satisfied with the state. It had won collective bargaining rights, and as the economy continued to grow so, too, did union membership. From 1945 to 1955 the number of Canadians belonging to trade unions rose from 15.7 per cent to 23.6 per cent of the country's workforce.(39) Having won most of the rights it had fought for during the war years, the labour movement became increasingly complacent. Nowhere was this more

evident than in the CCL. It was the CCL, after all, that had been the most vocal advocate of union rights during the war years. The prosperity attained during the post-war era meant that the CCL was satisfied by simply lobbying the Liberals or Conservatives for further concessions. The fact that this strategy following the traditional methods used by the TLC narrowed the differences between these two union organizations.

In addition, the removal of the Communists also paved the way towards organizational unity between the TLC and the CCL. Particularly in the CCL, the Communists had wielded tremendous influence both within its organization and amongst its union affiliates. As late as 1946, for example, ten of the CCL's twenty-three unions, representing approximately one-third of the organization's membership, were either Communist-led or influenced.(40) The advent of the Cold War led to the expulsion of the Communists from the CCL. Soon thereafter the CCL and the TLC approached one another to discuss the possibility of a merger.

In December 1953, a Unity Committee consisting of representatives from the TLC and the CCL was established.(41) In 1956, after two years of joint discussions, the TLC and the CCL merged to form the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). This new union organization united approximately three-quarters of Canada's labour movement.(42) More importantly for the CCF, the executive

council of the CLC contained a number of CCFers. Thus, it was to no surprise that the CCF, equipped with a more moderate political platform, and the CLC, more receptive to the party's more moderate stance, established a joint political committee in 1958. Eventually this committee became known as the National Committee for the New Party. Thus, the seeds were planted for the creation of a new political party in Canada.

The Founding of the New Democratic Party

Not all CCFers were keen on the idea of forming a new political party with closer links to organized labour. As early as 1945 many within the party saw labour as a hinderance to the movement rather than a valuable ally. Although the party bureaucrats, led by Lewis, were able to move the CCF towards the political centre, the left-wing of the party continued to voice its misgivings. For example, Carlyle King, the President of the Saskatchewan CCF, was quoted for saying in the *Canadian Forum* the following:

> The trouble is that socialist parties have gone a-whoring after the Bitch Goddess. They have wanted Success, Victory, Power; forgetting that the main business of socialist parties is not to form governments but to change minds. When people begin to concentrate on success at the polls, they become careful and cautious; and when they become careful and cautious, the virtue goes out of them.(43)

King's assessment is interesting because he criticizes the

party for becoming too preoccupied with seeking to improve its electoral fortunes. If this was truly the objective of the party's leaders, then they failed miserably during the 1950s.

As mentioned, the CCF won 28 seats during the 1945 federal election campaign. Despite closer CCF-labour relations during the 1950s, the party failed to make significant gains at the ballot box. Certainly, changes in the CCF's platform, and closer ties with labour, are not the sole factors for the party's declining electoral fortunes. However, during this period, the CCF did begin to experience an erosion of its traditional base of support in mainly rural Saskatchewan. In that province the party saw its number of federal seats decline from 18 in 1945 to a mere 5 in 1949.(44) Although making a slight comeback during the 1953 and 1957 federal elections, by the 1958 campaign the party had only one seat remaining in Saskatchewan. Similarly, the CCF's share of the popular also fell dramatically. In 1949, for instance, the CCF had 44.4 percent of the popular vote in Saskatchewan.(45) In 1958, though, the CCF's share of the popular vote in Saskatchewan had fallen to 28.4 percent.(46) Unfortunately for the CCF, while it lost a significant portion of the farm vote, it failed to make strong electoral gains at the federal level in the provinces with sizable unionized populations, such as Ontario and British Columbia.

With the CCF reduced to only 8 seats during the 1958 federal election, the party's leadership began working on yet another political strategy. For the party's leaders this meant moulding the CCF in a manner that would make it attractive to the growing numbers of middle-class Canadians and trade unionists. After two years of ongoing discussions with the CLC, the CCF endorsed the creation of the New Party at its 1960 convention.(47) Some party members, however, argued that the CCF would become dominated by trade unionists and consequently these newer members would move the CCF further towards the political centre. Indeed, reformism was far more attractive to most union leaders within the CLC than socialism.(48) Fears of union domination appeared very real because of the comments being made by many prominent CCFers. For instance, Stanley Knowles stated the following in 1961: "...one of the main reasons the New Party is coming into being is because labour wishes a more effective means...for making its contribution to the political life of this nation."(49) The CCF was eager to establish such a relationship with labour because it was expected to provide the party with much needed financial support and long-term electoral success. As well, the party's leadership felt that labour represented the working class and therefore was the natural ally of a left-of-centre party.

The transition from CCF to NDP was not an entirely

smooth one. Walter Pitman, for example, won a federal seat while running as a New Party candidate during a 1960 by-election. Although Pitman's election was prior to the NDP's founding convention, scheduled for August 1961, the CCF's parliamentary caucus seriously considered not recognizing Pitman as a caucus member.(50) The house leader of the CCF, Hazen Argue from Saskatchewan, along with many of the party's caucus members were not supportive of the New Party proposal. Argue challenged the party bureaucrats by first running against their choice for leader, Tommy Douglas, and then by publicly saying that he would quit the NDP because "a clique of Trade unionists"(51) had captured the party.

Thus, there were concerns over organized labour's influence in the NDP. Ultimately, however, these concerns were alleviated because there were few structural differences between the CCF and the NDP. The rules outlining union representation continued to guarantee the supremacy of the constituency association over local union affiliates. Additionally, there was not an overwhelming number of union locals which chose to affiliate with the NDP soon after it was founded. Although the CLC was enthusiastic over the creation of the new party, it had no authority to require its unions to affiliate with the NDP, and most chose not to.

Although the founding of the NDP in August 1961 did not lead to a significant number of local unions deciding to

affiliate, this was not a major concern for the party. Affiliation fees were not the major source of union contributions, nor did they represent a significant portion of the party's overall budget. The party's leadership, in fact, sought closer ties with labour because they thought it would translate into rank and file union support for the party during election time. Although many trade unionists did become avid party members and valuable volunteers during election time, the NDP failed to be the party of choice amongst trade unionists.

In 1962, the NDP participated in its first federal election. In many ways, the 1962 election results were neither overwhelmingly positive nor were they negative. On the one hand, the NDP did succeed in winning a record number 10 seats in British Columbia and 6 seats in Ontario. Many NDPers attributed these gains to labour's financial contributions and organizational expertise. On the other hand, the NDP won only 19 seats which was far less than expected. Interestingly, for the first time the party failed to win a single seat in Saskatchewan. For many within the party's left wing, the 1962 election was proof that moving away from its rural roots would do nothing to improve the party's electoral fortunes. Thus, the 1962 federal election failed to resolve the internal debate raging within the NDP over party policy and its relationship with organized labour.

Although the debate surrounding party-labour relations remained unresolved, statistical evidence shows that trade unionists did not rally behind the NDP during the 1962 federal election (Table 1.1).

TABLE 1.1

Trade Union Voting, Federal Election, 1962.

	Union Families	Non-Union Families
Conservative	26%	40%
Liberal	38	38
NDP	22	8

*Source: Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics*,1968,p41.

The data indicates that the NDP received fewer union votes than either the Conservatives or the Liberals. Certainly, then, while the leadership of the CLC was prepared to endorse the NDP, rank and file union members were not as eager to follow their leaders advice.

Unfortunately for the NDP, the inability of labour leaders to influence the voting behaviour of their members prevented the party from making substantial electoral gains in 1962. Additionally, many of the NDP's traditional supporters did not agree with the party's shift toward the

political centre. Now perceived by many as labour's party, the NDP lost further support from those people who had a negative image of the labour movement. Ultimately, these issues would continue to dominate the nature and scope of NDP-labour relations throughout the following decades.

Part 3.

NDP-Labour Relations: 1963-1988

From 1963 to 1988, the NDP found itself incapable of moving beyond the status of a minor party for several reasons. The change from CCF to NDP did not lead to large-scale union affiliation to the party. More seriously, however, the NDP failed to obtain significant support from rank and file trade unionists during election time. As stated earlier, many of the party's critics believed that the lack of electoral success was attributed to the party's shift towards the political centre. By the late 1960s, a significant number of NDP dissenters argued that the party should return to its socialist roots. Within the labour movement significant changes were also becoming evident. Labour found itself unprepared to deal with a series of economic crises which arose during the 1970s. As a result, conflict between international and national unions eventually changed the overall composition and policy direction of the CLC.

During the 1960s support for the NDP remained relatively unchanged. As discussed, the party had won 19

seats in 1962 and although it made marginal gains in terms of popular vote, by the 1968 election it won only 22 seats. For many NDPers, who had been opposed to the party's more moderate platform, electoral mediocrity was proof that the experiment had failed. Eventually known as the Waffle movement, this group of disaffected party members proposed that the NDP return to its socialist roots. They argued that Canada's sovereignty was threatened by foreign investment and control. Additionally, Wafflers favoured more social ownership and democratic control over all institutions within society. They also insisted that the party's bureaucrats be more open to criticism from its members as well. By 1969 this group drafted the Waffle Manifesto, which was presented and later defeated at the party's national convention in Winnipeg.

It is not surprising that the Waffle movement ultimately failed. After all, the majority of NDP members and convention delegates had consistently supported the party's shift to the political centre. By contrast, the Waffle Manifesto mirrored the Regina Manifesto in many ways. The first paragraph of the Waffle Manifesto stated the following: "Our aim as democratic socialists is to build an independent socialist Canada."(52) With respect to labour, the Waffle Manifesto argued that "It is now time to go beyond the welfare state."(53) The Manifesto's defeat in 1969 did not weaken the Waffle movement and the movement's

leader, Jim Laxer, would eventually challenge David Lewis for the party's leadership during its 1971 convention.

The party's selection of David Lewis as their leader was significant in determining future relations between the NDP and organized labour. David Lewis had been actively seeking labour's support for the party since the late 1930s. He had also been instrumental during negotiations with CLC leaders to create the NDP in 1961. Now that Lewis was running for leadership of the NDP, it was clear which candidate labour was prepared to support. In fact, the overwhelming majority of labour delegates did support David Lewis over Jim Laxer in a what was a very close leadership race. If Laxer had won the leadership contest, the NDP would have certainly moved to the left and that would have had a negative impact on the party's relationship with the labour establishment. However, it is unclear, and almost impossible to assess, whether or not the NDP would have gained support from rank and file trade unionists had Laxer won the leadership of the NDP.

Within a year of becoming leader of the NDP, David Lewis led his party into an election. In 1972, the NDP won a party high of 31 seats. However, despite the increase in seats, the NDP's percentage of the popular vote of 17.7 percent was not much higher than the party's 1968 showing when it received 17 percent support from the electorate.(54) In fact, the highest level of popular support received by

the NDP was in 1988 when the party received 20.4 percent of the popular vote. Thus, on a nation-wide basis, support for the NDP during the 1970s-1980s remained relatively unchanged. Why did the party fail to make significant electoral gains? It appears that while union leaders supported the party, rank and file trade unionists continued to vote Liberal or Conservative. Moreover, since the NDP appeared stuck as a minor third party, many trade unionists often voted Liberal as a way of preventing the Conservatives from forming the government. During the 1974 federal election, for example, most trade unionists voted Liberal because the Conservatives had promised to introduce wage controls during the campaign.

Table 1.2

PARTY VOTE BY UNION STATUS, 1979 & 1984

1979	Non-Unionists (%)	Members of Non-affiliated Unions (%)	Members of Affiliated Unions (%)	N
Liberal	42.2	41.8	40.4	(899)
Conservative	43.1	31.9	28.6	(817)
New Democrat	11.5	20.0	29.9	(336)
N	(1221)	(812)	(110)	
1984				
Liberal	25.9	24.9	7.5	(742)
Conservative	60.2	53.5	53.7	(1697)
New Democrat	13.1	20.3	38.8	(485)
N	(1761)	(1122)	(67)	

Source: Keith Archer, *Political Choices and Electoral Consequences*, 1990, pp. 62-63.

Table 1.2 shows that among non-affiliated union members, the NDP finished third, behind both the Conservatives and the Liberals during the 1979 and 1984 election campaigns. Interestingly in 1979 members of affiliated unions overwhelmingly supported the Liberals and only marginally favoured the NDP over the Conservatives. During the 1984 federal election, the results indicate that members of affiliated unions supported the Conservatives far more than they did for the NDP. Clearly, then, the majority of trade unionists were not voting for the NDP. As well, even those members from affiliated union locals, to a lesser degree, supported either the Conservatives or the Liberals over the NDP.

Table 1.3

Unions Affiliated with the NDP and Membership of Affiliated Unions as a Percentage of Total Union Membership, Selected Years

Year	Number of Affiliated Locals	Members of Affiliated Locals('000s)	Total Union Membership ('000s)	Union Members Affiliated (%)
1961	278	71	1423	5.0
1962	612	186	1449	12.9
1963	689	218	1493	14.6
1964	683	216	1589	13.6
1969	764	256	2075	12.3
1974	754	283	2732	10.4
1979	745	295	3397	8.7
1984	730	267	3651	7.3

Source: NDP files, "Organizations affiliated with the NDP," selected years; Canada, Labour Canada, *Directory of Labour Organizations in Canada,* 1984.

The transition from CCF to NDP also failed to lead to large-scale union affiliation with the party. Table 1.3 indicates that shortly after the NDP was founded the number of union locals choosing to affiliate with the party more than doubled. However, by 1963, and only two years after the creation of the NDP, the affiliation process had peaked. Table 1.3 shows that the number of union members belonging to affiliated unions, as a percentage of Canada's total union membership, steadily declined from a high of 14.6 percent in 1963 to a low of 7.3 percent by 1984. This decline is attributed to the number of new labour organizations, including public-sector unions, which grew rapidly during this period but were not interested in affiliating with the party. Therefore, formal links between the NDP and labour have never comprised a large percentage of Canada's total union membership.

Table 1.4

Federal New Democratic Party Revenues, 1980-81, 1984-85

Source	1980	1981	1984	1985
Union				
Affiliation Dues	$ 338,271	353,300	417,480	566,833
Other Union	1,364,557	161,886	1,741,575	302,568
UNION TOTAL	1,702,828	515,186	2,159,055	869,401
FEDERAL TOTAL	4,920,447	3,855,812	7,356,903	6,284,316

Source: Canada, Elections Canada, *Registered Party Fiscal Period Returns,* selected years.

The data in table 1.4 divides labour's financial contributions to the NDP into two categories and the years selected illustrate the difference between union totals in election years (1980,1984) and non-election years (1981,1985). Table 1.4 shows that union affiliation dues were small, yet steady, as a percentage of total federal party revenues. However, other union contributions fluctuated tremendously between election and non-election years. This is a significant point because it illustrates the importance of having labour as an ally during election time. Labour's financial contributions greatly enhanced its ability to influence the policy direction taken by the party. The party bureaucrats recognized that an NDP election platform had to conform with the interests of

labour if it expected to receive much needed financial contributions. Moreover, this need for labour's financial support was only further exacerbated as election campaign costs escalated quickly during this period.

The Transformation of Labour in Canada

While the NDP struggled to improve its electoral fortunes, the labour movement in Canada experienced a number of profound changes. Rising inflation and unemployment rates combined with declining economic growth made labour far more militant during the 1970s than it had been during the economically prosperous 1960s. A rift within the international unions soon emerged when American union leaders eagerly supported protectionist government measures as a way to save jobs, even if it was at the expense of their Canadian members.(55) Unhappy with this stance, many of the Canadian affiliates broke their ties with these internationals to create the Council of Canadian Unions. The majority, however, demanded, and eventually received, greater autonomy from the internationals while remaining within the CLC.

In addition to the emerging differences between national and international unions was the growth of public-sector unions. Public-sector union growth can be attributed to the expansion in the size of government at all three levels. The many social programs and services introduced

during the 1960s and 1970s required thousands of new government employees to implement and administer. Representing the majority of these workers was the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE). CUPE's growth had a significant impact on the future course of action taken by the CLC. Once dominated by private sector workers, the CLC was increasingly becoming influenced by public-sector workers. During the 1974 CLC convention it was CUPE which organized a reform group to question the role of the international unions. By 1975 CUPE became the largest union in Canada. Paralleling the growth of the public-sector unions was the decline in the number of international unions in Canada. Their share of organized workers fell from 71 percent in 1965 to 51 percent in 1975.(56)

The tremendous rate of growth that was occurring amongst nationals led to tension between these unions and the internationals within the CLC. The internationals were vehemently opposed to the notions of Canadian nationalism and autonomy. Although the internationals were in a state of numerical decline, they still held the balance of power within the CLC. Consequently, the NDP was forced to back down from pursuing a more nationalistic agenda, which would have attracted the rank and file fearful that their jobs were threatened because of the growing threat of American protectionism. Robert Laxer points out that in 1975, the president of the CLC, Joe Morris, "...made it clear that

continued financial and other backing of the CLC for the NDP would depend in the future on a continued rejection of nationalism as the answer to that threat of multinational corporations in Canada."(57) Not until the national unions were able to comprise a strong majority within the CLC did the organization alter its stance on this issue.

The CLC, however, did step up its political activity. When the Liberals imposed compulsory wage and price controls in 1975, the CLC successfully organized a "Day of Protest" the following year.(58) However, labour's opposition, although impressive, did not convince the Liberals to reverse their decision. It soon became clear to many union leaders that only with closer ties to the NDP could labour's political objectives be realized. This growing sentiment was gradually reinforced during the late seventies and early eighties as national unions continued to grow. By 1986, 61 percent of organized workers were in national unions and only 39 percent in international unions.(59)

Why, then, did the NDP fail to attract support from rank and file trade unionists during this period? The answer is that NDP-labour relations were shaped by way of discussions between prominent party members and union leaders. Labour's ties with the NDP were seldom determined by the workers themselves. Not surprisingly, union leaders invariably failed to influence the voting behaviour of their members. Additionally, the structure of the labour movement

in Canada inhibited its ability to act as a unified body. Although the majority of labour unions were part of the CLC, that organization did not have the authority to dictate to its members how to act. For the NDP that meant that receiving an endorsement from the CLC did not necessarily mean that support from all of the Congress's members would follow. To further complicate matters, individual unions themselves were often divided along provincial or regional lines when deciding whether or not to support the NDP. Ultimately, labour's sizeable financial contributions helped the NDP, but failure to obtain support from the rank and file prevented the party from seriously challenging the Liberals and Conservatives during this period.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented an historical review of the key events and issues that have shaped the NDP's relationship with organized labour. Moreover, this chapter has clearly shown that this relationship has been tenuous at best. The CCF-NDP has never been a labour party. The founding of the CCF was made possible only with the cooperation of various farmer, labour and socialist groups. Thus, labour was merely one component of a much larger coalition of interests united by their common belief that political change was necessary to reverse the economic misery caused by the Depression.

During the 1930s labour's support for the CCF was almost non-existent. The labour movement in Canada, traditionally weak and fragmented, was limited further by the Depression. With few financial resources, a small membership, and with the majority of its leaders unwilling to support direct political action, labour's role and influence within the CCF remained marginal.

The advent of the Second World War, however, permanently changed the nature of CCF-labour relations. Industrial expansion and full employment was realized during the war years because Canada had to supply itself and its allies with the necessary supplies to defeat the Axis powers. Rapid industrial expansion also led to a sizeable increase in the number of industrial unions in Canada. These industrial unions, many of which were organized by the Communists, were increasingly militant and politically active. In 1940, they formed the CCL and in less than three years the new organization endorsed the CCF. With significant labour backing and a growing number of supporters and members, the CCF appeared on the verge of assuming power in the upcoming 1945 election. The governing Liberals, however, spoiled any plans that the CCF may have had. The Liberals responded to the CCF threat by making key concessions to labour. They also forged an alliance with the Communists in a number of key industrial constituencies in order to defeat the CCF.

The CCF's disappointing showing during the 1945 election forced the party to re-examine its political strategy. The CCF's left-wing argued that the more moderate position expressed in the pages of the 1944 manifesto was to blame. The party's leaders, however, were committed to steering the CCF further towards the political centre. The second part of this chapter has illustrated why the CCF decided to draft and approve the more moderate Winnipeg Declaration of Principles to supersede the party's Regina Manifesto. The CCF hoped that a more moderate political platform would attract the growing numbers of middle class Canadians and trade unionists. Although the CCF's electoral fortunes continued to decline, trade union leaders were increasingly supportive of the party. The merger between the TLC and the CCL to form the CLC provided the CCF with much needed financial support. During the following years the CCF, with cooperation from the CLC, created the NDP. Despite the fanfare associated with the announcement of the new party, the NDP failed to make the electoral gains it had hoped for during its first election campaign in 1962. Many of the party's members grew increasingly critical of its closer ties with the labour movement. They also argued that the NDP's acceptance of the welfare state, instead of socialism, contributed to the party's electoral woes.

The third, and final, section of this chapter examined the NDP's electoral performance from the 1960s to the 1980s

and the party's relationship with organized labour. The NDP's relationship with labour became increasingly controversial. By the late 1960s the Waffle faction within the NDP urged that the party return to its socialist roots. On the other hand, the party's leadership appeared committed to the principles of closer ties with labour and political moderation. Did the NDP ultimately benefit electorally because of its closer ties to organized labour? Using selected years, table 1.2 illustrated that rank and file trade unionists did not support the NDP over the Liberals and Conservatives. Moreover, the data from table 1.3 showed that the number of Canadians belonging to affiliated unions were always small when compared to the size of the country's total union membership. In terms of financial contributions, table 1.4 showed that union dues from affiliation were minor, yet steady, whereas other union contributions tended to be sizeable although only during election years.

Part three of this chapter examined the changes that occurred within the labour movement between 1963 to 1988. Additionally, by the mid-1970s the CLC, now dominated by these national unions, supported the NDP more enthusiastically than ever before. As mentioned, however, this enthusiasm failed to spill over and influence the voting preferences of the rank and file.

Clearly, then, the analysis has demonstrated that there

are many factors which have influenced the nature and scope of NDP-labour relations. At times, labour has perceived its relationship with the NDP as advantageous. Still, there have been other times when labour has distanced itself from the party. The NDP, however, has been more consistent with its position. The party has always welcomed labour's support while at the same time it has guarded against possible trade union domination. Finally, it is important to note that NDP-labour relations have been determined mostly by the various leaders of these two organizations. Consequently, even when NDP-labour relations were good, the voting behaviour of rank and file trade unionists did not alter greatly. By contrast, many of the NDP's traditional supporters grew disillusioned because of the party's abandonment of the socialist cause. Interestingly, the following chapters will show that NDP-labour relations have endured many of these same qualities during the 1990s. This chapter, therefore, has provided the foundation necessary for the remainder of this study.

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LITERATURE REVIEW

CHAPTER TWO

This chapter provides a review of the literature regarding NDP-labour relations from 1988 to 1995. Included in this chapter are various newspaper articles, books, NDP documents including renewal conference literature, and various labour discussion papers. As discussed in chapter one, NDP-labour relations have always been dynamic and complicated. At times, for instance, labour has been divided over its role in politics. During the 1930s and 1940s industrial unions were more politically active than their craft union counterparts from the TLC. By the 1960s and 1970s, the growth of the national union led by the public sector unions, sparked the re-emergence of a more militant and politically active labour movement.

The growth of the public sector unions has had a profound impact on labour-NDP relations in the 1990s. This is because provincial NDP governments have been faced with either downsizing the public service, to the dismay of their traditional union supporters, or maintaining the status quo, thus angering the majority of the electorate. The literature clearly points to the fact that when in government, the dynamics which influence party-labour relations change dramatically. As well, literature probing into the NDP's organizational structure, its presence and influence in Quebec, and its ideological orientation are

also discussed.

In addition, this chapter exposes the multitude of factors which have compelled the NDP and organized labour to re-examine their role with one another. More specifically, the serious decline of the federal NDP during the 1993 election has led many within the labour movement and the NDP to doubt the value of a continued relationship. Not all segments of the labour movement, however, are critical of the NDP. For example, the literature review will show that most private-sector unions continue to remain loyal to the NDP. Thus, there are divisions within the labour movement as to whether it is politically advantageous to have ties with the NDP. Similarly, the NDP has openly questioned what labour's role within the party, if any, should be. Lastly, and most importantly, it can be clearly drawn from the review of the literature that NDP-labour tensions stem from a number of organizational deficiencies. These organizational deficiencies not only adversely effect NDP-labour relations, they also impair the federal party's ability to devise a coherent political strategy.

The Political Party: A Theoretical Perspective

A theoretical explanation of the role political parties play in society, as well as their organizational structure, is an extremely valuable prerequisite for the understanding of the pertinent factors which have shaped NDP-labour relations in the 1990s. After all, political parties are in

fact organizations which have their own internal authority structures and decision-making capacities.

The political party must contend with a number of organizational dilemmas. It must maintain organizational continuity and hierarchical stability, while at the same time, it must offer incentives to various sub-groups and individuals in order to receive support.(1) Angelo Panebianco contends that a political party must offer both collective and selective incentives in order to avoid intra-party conflict.(2) Under the collective incentives theory one participates because he/she shares the same political or social goals as the party's other participants. Selective incentives, on the other hand, describe the benefits received by only some members for their participation, such as promotion within the party's hierarchy.

The political party must counterbalance the distribution of selective incentives with collective incentives because one works against the other.(3) Party elites, for instance, often participate with the expectation of personal reward. Their dedication to the organization therefore is not for the exclusive purpose of advancing the organization's principles. Personal ambition, however, must not disrupt the organization's ideology or "cause" because it conceals the distribution of selective incentives from those who do not benefit.(4) This is an important point because it explains, in part, why during periods of

ideological change, intra-party conflict within the NDP has erupted. Most notably, the transition from CCF to NDP angered many party members, as well as the party's socialist wing, because it was seen as an attempt by the party to strengthen its ties with labour at their expense. These internal divisions in fact plagued the NDP until the expulsion of the Wafflers in the early 1970s. On the other hand, it could also be argued that since there were no significant structural differences between the CCF and its successor the NDP, the NDP successfully distributed a collective incentive to labour while concealing the distribution of selective incentives to non-labour members. Indeed, labour's representation whether at party conventions or on Federal Council did not change after the party's transition from the CCF to the NDP.

Panebianco's organizational analysis also sheds light on why NDP-labour relations appear to deteriorate when the party forms the government. This is because when in government, the importance of adhering to the party's ideology and its principles are not considered as important as the managerial responsibilities associated with governing. As a result, many of those participants once united by a common cause become alienated when it becomes clear that the party is incapable of implementing all of its promises. Thus, the collective incentive for many members is lost and consequently a party loses rank and file

support.

Similarly, Samuel Eldersveld, whose research has focused on party structure, argues: "The party is a mutually exploitative relationship - it is joined by those who would use it; it mobilizes for the sake of power those who would join it."(5) Clearly, the relationships between the party and its various supporters is seen in a similar fashion not only between Eldersveld and Panebianco, but with Goldman's transaction analysis, as well. All three believe that the party must offer some form of incentive to attractive participants, and that the participants must likewise offer something of value to the party in return. Therefore, when examining NDP-labour relations, it is important to uncover what the gains and losses have been for both sides under the rules which have defined the parameters of their relationship.

Party Structure

The NDP is unique in its structural composition when compared to Canada's traditional parties. Unlike the Conservatives and the Liberals, the NDP is an integrated party which means that there is no clear separation (with the exception of the NDP's Quebec wing) between its provincial and federal wings. Consequently, any person who chooses to join the NDP automatically becomes a member of both the federal party and the provincial party. The

serious decline of the federal NDP has led many within the party to re-examine its organizational structure. For example, should the party be more centralized or decentralized? Is the NDP's financial structure placing the federal party at a disadvantage in relation to its provincial wings? Lastly,should there be structural changes in order to improve how the NDP formulates its policies?

Alan Sharp, maintains that a major problem with the NDP is that the Federal Party does not know who its members are. Under the party's current constitution the provincial wings have control of the membership lists. Sharp contends that the Federal Party must be given these membership lists so that it can communicate with its members more directly. In addition to Sharp's article, Brian Harling's *Why Separate Federal and Provincial Memberships Won't Work* and Marion Dewar's *Restructuring of the New Democratic Party of Canada*, argue for a stronger federal wing as well. The main issue is centred around money. Currently, the Federal Party receives 15 per cent of all revenues raised by the provincial wing as its main source of money.(6) As well, the NDP's provincial wings are responsible for giving 60 percent of the monies collected from its affiliated trade unions to the federal NDP.(7) Since the Federal Party relies on the provincial wing for its revenues derived from provincial membership lists, it is clear why the federal party wants access to them. As Sharp points out: "Some

means must be found for the Federal Party to have its own membership lists, and to be free to organize them, communicate with them and ask them directly for money."(8)

By contrast, many provincial leaders, described by Whitehorn as feudal barons,(9) are opposed to the prospect of having to compete with the Federal Party for funds. According to Ian McLeod, the provinces often fall behind in their payments to the Federal Party.(10) The Federal Party, unfortunately, does not have the authority to force the provincial sections to pay. In fact, during the mid-1980s many provinces had fallen so far behind in their payments that the Federal Party worked out an agreement which saw it receive $1.00 for every $2.00 owed.(11) For obvious reasons this dependence on the party's provincial wings has made it difficult for the Federal Party to plan its own budget both during election and non-elections years. Moreover, the financial committee of the Federal Party is made up of the NDP's provincial and territorial treasurers.(12) In other words, those responsible for approving Federal Party expenditures are the same people who have often fallen behind in their payments to the Federal Party.

The legality of the NDP's rules outlining party finance is also open to question. The passage of the *Elections Expenses Act* in 1974 was intended to permit federal political parties to issue tax exemption receipts for political donations. However, because the NDP's provincial

wings are responsible for handling membership funds, in actual fact, the federal exemption has helped the NDP's provincial wings. When considering that the provinces have fallen behind in their payments to the Federal Party, while at the same time benefitting from a federal tax exemption, it is obvious why some New Democrats are dissatisfied with the current financial arrangement.

Another contentious issue surrounding the NDP's organizational structure is that the provincial presence within the Federal Party is increased further during election campaigns. McLeod points out that "The provincial offices house the field organizers and co-ordinate much of the federal election advertising and federal worker training."(13) As well, the Strategy and Election Planning Committee (SEPC), which becomes the key body of the party during federal elections, includes many imports from its provincial wings.

In addition to being comprised of many provincial party staffers, the SEPC was expanded to 50 members by the 1993 federal election. The expansion of the SEPC was in response to labour's criticisms that it did not have an adequate voice within the decision-making process during the 1988 campaign.(14) Moreover, Whitehorn points out that because of its large size, the SEPC had a number of smaller steering committees. The most important of these committees in 1993 was the 14 person election platform committee. This

committee was responsible for creating a political platform from the hundreds of resolutions presented at NDP conventions.(15) Although the expansion of the SEPC was designed to give party members a greater voice in the decision-making process, its large size diminished the likelihood of achieving the consensus necessary for developing a coherent electoral platform.

The process by which resolutions are passed within the NDP also contributes to the party's inability to develop an articulate a coherent political message. Historically, resolutions presented at party conventions have come from local NDP ridings. As a result, hundreds of various resolutions reach the convention floor. However, few of these resolutions are actually discussed because a Resolutions Committee is responsible for deciding which resolutions will actually be debated.(16) According to Sharp, this is a "morale sapping process" because it prevents the discussion of controversial topics.(17) In short, then, policy development within the NDP, although encouraged, is significantly controlled by the party's elite. Moreover, the introduction of hundreds of resolutions at party conventions complicates and frustrates the party's ability to formulate a clear and concise political platform.

The NDP's integrated structure has also frustrated the Federal Party's electoral fortunes because it is

incompatible with the realities of Canadian federalism. The premise behind the NDP's integrated model is that its members are united by their social democratic beliefs. In reality, however, the views of social democrats in rural Saskatchewan, for instance, are different from those in Ontario. This reality has further complicated the Federal Party's ability to develop policies because the differences between its provincial wings translate into a mishmash of policy proposals. As Steve Lee points out: The Integrated Party is not realistic given the profoundly regional, decentralized and federal nature of Canada."(18) As well, Nelson Riis, one of the few federal NDP MPs to retain his seat after the 1993 election, describes the federal NDP as "a collection of provincial organizations whose first thought is not the federal party and often not Canada."(19) Clearly, the value of the NDP's integrated structure is questionable, and now seriously challenged following the Federal Party's dismal electoral showing in 1993.

Although the party established the Council of Federal Ridings (CFR) in 1990 to encourage greater focus on federal issues, this new body has few powers. Donna Shire contends that the CFR's did not have direct access to the local ridings, nor did they have a notable presence within the SEPC.(20) Thus, the presence of the CFR's were more symbolic than practical. Moreover, the establishment of the CFR's has, according to Whitehorn, swelled the number of

Federal Council members from 150 to an unmanageable 200.(21) Clearly, then, while the CFR's have produced few tangible benefits for the Federal Party, their presence has only added another layer to an already overweight and complicated bureaucratic structure.

The integrated structure of the NDP has also meant that the Federal Party's popularity has often been directly related to the popularity of NDP provincial governments. In 1993, the unpopularity of the Ontario NDP government, for instance, had a profound impact on the electoral fortunes of the Federal Party. Many of the Federal Party's traditional labour supporters either reduced or diverted their contributions originally allocated to the Federal Party because of the social contract legislation passed by the NDP in Ontario.(22) Therefore, in addition to examining NDP-labour relations at the federal level, it is also necessary to examine the dynamics of this relationship at the provincial level, as well.

Party Leadership

Literature which examined the role, and the impact, of the NDP's last two leaders, Ed Broadbent and Audrey McLaughlin, was also reviewed. In Judy Steed's *Ed Broadbent: The Pursuit of Power,* there is a very sympathetic evaluation of Broadbent's leadership of the NDP. Steed points out that the party had its best ever showing

under Broadbent's reign, citing examples that the NDP had reached a record high support rating in the summer of 1987 (44%), and won a record number of seats and popular vote in the 1988 election.(23) Robert Campbell and Leslie Pal, however, in *The Real Worlds of Canadian Politics,* second edition, note that Broadbent's support for the Meech Lake Accord angered many of the party's traditional supporters such as Aboriginals, women's groups, and labour.(24) Additionally, Whitehorn criticizes Broadbent for becoming too cautious and dependent on polling as the party grew in popularity. He also accuses Broadbent and his advisors of not taking a strong stance against free trade in 1988 for the purpose of making political gains in Quebec because most Quebecers were in favour of free trade.(25) This position not only failed to lead to electoral gains in Quebec for the NDP, but it also caused a serious rift between labour leaders, strongly opposed to the Free Trade deal, and the party.

Audrey McLaughlin was elected to succeed Broadbent during the NDP's 1989 leadership convention. McLaughlin, an outspoken opponent of the Meech Lake Accord and the only female candidate to run for the party's leadership, defeated Dave Barrett after a long battle on the fourth ballot. According to McLeod, McLaughlin received the support of most of the labour delegates at the convention, including two of Canada's most prominent labour leaders, Bob White and

Steelworkers director Leo Gerard.(26) Labour's support for McLaughlin, however, declined steadily during the period leading up to the 1993 election campaign. Labour leaders became increasingly agitated over McLaughlin's apparent unwillingness to criticize the Rae government's performance in Ontario. McLeod points out that labour was angered by McLaughlin's initial refusal to criticize Rae's social contract legislation.(27) Consequently, labour's enthusiasm for the federal NDP diminished substantially in terms of personnel support and financial contributions. More importantly, emerging out of the ashes of the federal NDP's electoral performance was a great deal of mistrust between the party and many unions within the Canadian labour movement.

The NDP in Quebec: Le Néant

The NDP has never been much of a political force in Quebec. Electoral support for the NDP's predecessor, the CCF, during election time averaged only 1.5 per cent from 1935 to 1958.(28) Moreover, Whitehorn notes that in successive elections from 1962 to 1988, the NDP managed to obtain on average only 8.1 per cent of the total vote in Quebec. In fact, the NDP has only won one seat in Quebec, that during a 1990 by-election in Chambly. Electoral data obtained from Frizzell, Pammett and Westell show that the sole NDP incumbent in Quebec, Phil Edmonston, did not run

for re-election during the 1993 federal election. Incidently, on election night the Bloc Québécois candidate received 59.7 percent of the vote in Chambly while the New Democrat candidate received only 2.9 percent of the vote.(29) According to McLeod, the NDP in Quebec received less than 2 percent of the vote and eighteen of its candidates in fact collected fewer votes than the Natural Law Party in 1993.(30)

NDP-labour relations within the province of Quebec have also been particularly weak. Archer indicates that as of 1985 only 12 union locals were affiliated to the NDP in Quebec, accounting for only 1.6 per cent of affiliated locals nationwide.(31) Why have ties between the NDP and the labour movement been largely insignificant in the province of Quebec? Robert Laxer explains that the labour movement in Quebec has been distinct and increasingly separate from labour organizations in the rest of Canada.(32) The powerful Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU), made up of mostly public sector unions, and the Union of Quebec Teachers (Corporation des enseignents du Quebec or CEQ) are two of the largest labour organizations in Quebec, and neither of these two organizations are affiliated to the CLC. According to Laxer, the nationalism of Quebec labour "...was focussed mainly on the domination of Quebec by the Canadian federal state."(33) Not surprisingly, then, a significant number of labour unions in

Quebec support the sovereignty option. In fact, a *Toronto Star* article, written by Robert McKenzie on March 26, 1995 described the CNTU's president, Gerald Larose, as "one of the most ardent supporters of the sovereigntist cause."(34) Moreover, formal ties between labour and the NDP, and electoral support for the party in Quebec have been almost non-existent. For these reasons this study will, for the most part, exclude the province of Quebec.

Ideology and the NDP

In an article written in the *Toronto Star*, Steven Langdon states, referring to the NDP, that: "The future will result from the same activism and on-the-ground struggle that built progressive political movements throughout Canada's history."(35) Moreover, Langdon's argument is that the Party needs to be more active rather than just debating political philosophy like the Liberals and Conservatives. This sentiment is echoed by many other party members, including Eugene Kostyra. Kostyra, one of the party's regional directors, contends that the NDP has to differentiate itself from the other parties and that "...it must be truly a left Party...."It must understand that there is a ruling class and a working class and it must govern on the side of the working class."(36) While, Kostyra's sentiment reflects a common position within the NDP, empirical research indicates "... that the party

conventions today may not have as strong a working-class base as in the past."(37). For example, Whitehorn and Archer, on the basis of NDP convention studies, indicate that 31.6% of Party members consider themselves as lower-middle, working or lower class. By contrast, 68.5% of those surveyed were described as upper, upper-middle, or middle class (47.3% considered themselves middle class, 20.5% classified themselves as upper-middle class, and 0.7% considered themselves as upper-class).(38)

It appears that the changing face of NDP members has had an impact on the Party and its policies. This is not to suggest that a person's class necessarily reflects how he/she stands on a certain issue. Rather, it does suggest that it becomes increasingly more difficult for the NDP to hold on to principles that may be seen now as obsolete because of the ever changing mix of an already diverse and dynamic membership and electorate. The Whitehorn-Archer study also points to some important differences of opinion among convention delegates in 1987. For example, when asked if the NDP should move more clearly to the left 39.9% agreed while 37.9% disagreed.(39) Furthermore, 63.3% of convention delegates, in 1987, agreed that there were significant differences between the left and the right within the Party.(40) Not surprisingly, the miserable showing made by the NDP during the 1993 election has made these differences more profound, and at the same time, more

public. This is because each side has chosen to blame the other for the NDP's serious electoral decline.

While some prominent NDPers, such as Party secretary Fraser Green, suggest that the post-October era opens the door to turn "crisis into opportunity,"(41) the fact of the matter is that there is a great deal of potential for conflict between various groups within the Party over its future. Stephen Langdon, for example, is critical of the national party executive for deciding unilaterally to cancel the 1994 convention. This, Langdon argues, has meant that the executive elected in 1991 still controls the party despite its decline. He describes the executive membership as the "...same questionable group, who took the party from a 30 per cent popular rating...in 1989...to just over 7 per cent in 1993."(42) The prospects, however, for conflict should not be overstated because despite the differences in opinion on specific issues, there is a general consensus that the Party stands for social justice and equality. Once again, referring to NDP delegates, Whitehorn and Archer, for instance, argue that members of the NDP were further 'left' than their Liberal and Conservative counterparts.(43) For the purpose of this study, this information is important to keep in mind because it demonstrates that the terms 'left' and 'right' are being used in the context of the NDP only and not within the broader Canadian political spectrum.

Articles written by a number of NDP members indicate

that the building blocks for renewal do exist. Pat Lorje states, in an article presented at the August renewal conference, that: "We can't always agree with each other, but we share a passionate belief that we can somehow create a perfect community for all people. Not just for a privileged minority."(44) Lorje then admits that the party has difficulty in identifying who the NDP should represent. Moreover, Lorje is critical of the Party for blindly supporting certain issues without any debate. Examples used by Lorje include; to be a supporter of the left you must oppose free trade, support all social programs and argue for the maintenance of universality for these programs, and you must support the expansion of the social safety net. Lorje concludes her article by appealing to the Party for "no labels" and to avoid special interest thinking when discussing strategies and solutions.

Howard Pawley suggests that democratic socialism has been put on the defensive by the neo-conservatives even though issues such as poverty and unemployment have become dominant in the 1990s. Pawley argues that the Party "...appeared ambiguous in [its] articulation of an alternative agenda..."(45) and that "...the collapse of communism was interpreted not as an indictment of totalitarianism but rather that of socialism."(46) Clearly, then, Pawley's article suggests that the Party's failure is both a product of political strategy and of ideology in the

post-Cold War era. Moreover, he proposes that the NDP offer Canadians an alternative vision, for example the extension of the Goods and Services Tax to financial services.(47) Pawley concludes by advocating that the NDP become more of a mass party.

Duncan Cameron, in his editorial in the *Canadian Forum,* believes that the NDP has a choice between two political strategies:

> It can follow its provincial government wings and adopt a centre-left stance, in the belief that no one can outflank the NDP on the left; or it can plant its flag clearly on the left, and work within the universe of those who are the natural constituencies of the NDP.(48)

Cameron sees the latter strategy as more appropriate because it is seen as the best way to build community support. He points out that building community support should start with strengthening the party's relationship with the labour movement. A number of questions stem from Cameron's argument. Will the NDP have to change its organizational structure to accommodate various local interests, including the labour movement, necessary for building community support? Or, will the NDP formulate a political platform that aggressively represents the needs of various community groups?

James Laxer concentrates his criticism towards the neo-conservatives for attempting to manipulate people into thinking that Government is the problem. Instead, Laxer

contends that governments have a positive role to play in the economy, such as creating jobs, rather than supporting the costs of unemployment and underemployment. It is Laxer's opinion that neo-conservative policies such as free trade, and the encouragement of globalization, have led to less government revenues and more expenditures to people who need assistance. Laxer uses data from Statistics Canada to illustrate the sorry state of working people in Canada. For example in 1992, only "... 31% of all workers had full time, year round jobs, which paid more than $30,000 a year.(49) And, "...42% of workers were employed part time, full time or on a temporary basis, or were unemployed for part of the year."(50) The statistical data used by Laxer is designed to illustrate the disastrous results of neo-conservative policies and to reinforce his notion that if governments create jobs, then people would become contributors to the economy, as consumers and tax payers, instead of looking to the state for financial aid. Therefore, it is fair to assume that Laxer sees government involvement in job creation as a way of cutting government deficits, instead of cutting jobs, expenditures, and government downsizing that has been occurring in the 1990s.

Persuading the general public that government involvement is good, however, has become increasingly difficult in the 1990s. For example, Alan Whitehorn suggests that the neo-conservatism has led to increased

taxation on the middle class and the free trade agreement.(51) He also points out that the constitutional quagmire engineered by Canada's politicians has made Canadians increasingly distrustful of government.

Judy Rebick considers the participation of interest groups and the population in general as fundamental for the renewal of the NDP. Rebick points to the successes of the Reform Party as an example of the political benefits from encouraging greater public participation in politics. By failing to do this, Rebick argues, the perception of the NDP has shifted to that of a traditional party. Consequently, this has led to an erosion of the Party's support. Pawley, too, shares Rebick's opinion on this issue when he suggests that the Party's support for the Charlottetown Accord, despite public opinion on the issue, created an impression that the NDP was part of the elite. Rebick concludes by stating that "Rather than distancing itself from the labour movement, the Party should deepen its relationship with labour at the grass roots level..."(52) The relevance of Labour cannot be ignored and will now be looked at in more detail.

The NDP's Relationship With Labour

The NDP's relationship with labour has been a central issue within the party both in the past and now at present. As mentioned, there are those such as Kostyra, Rebick, and Langdon,

among others, who support stronger ties with labour. By contrast, there have been others who consider the Party's ties with Labour as detrimental. To examine this issue more closely the material reviewed uncovered a number of important facts which can help shed light on this subject. Keith Archer, indicates that the change from the CCF to NDP has never brought widespread support from the labour movement. Archer contends that the Party structure of the NDP has meant that affiliated unions generally comprise approximately 20% of convention delegates.(53) Furthermore, despite a public image as being the party closely aligned to labour, the NDP has traditionally had few unions affiliated to it. In fact, only 2.8% of the total Labour workforce is affiliated to the NDP.(54) From Archer's evidence two questions can be asked. First, does the lack of Labour's support mean that the Party should make an effort to forge closer ties? Or, does the lack of Labour's support make it more of a liability to the Party? Answering these questions are by no means easy because they are being asked not only by New Democrats but also by the labour movement.

Before discussing the current state of relations between the NDP and labour, it is important to see how each side views its relationship with the other. While some argue that the labour movement is merely another special interest group, others see the relationship as more equal and intimate. In a paper presented to the Canadian Labour

Congress (CLC), Whitehorn argues that "...working in tandem with the CLC, the CCF successfully transformed itself in 1961 into the NDP and social democracy acquired a new momentum."(55) In an Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) report, Labour's relationship is described in a similar fashion. The OFL report describes the relationship as a "partnership" and that the CLC "...adopted a resolution in support of the already established national committee for a new party, and in early 1961 they launched a campaign to raise funds for the founding convention."(56) Whitehorn and Archer, however, point out that many within the NDP have alleged that the "...conservative orientation of labour, combined with its prominence and stature within the party, has effectively prevented the NDP from cultivating a political soil capable of nourishing the seeds of socialism."(57) Obviously, then, while some have viewed the NDP-Labour relationship as a partnership between equals, others view Labour as a hinderance to socialism because of the alleged conservative orientation of Labour within the Party.

Archer and Whitehorn test whether the labour component of the NDP is in fact noticeably more conservative than non-union members. A number of questionnaires using Likert scales which were circulated during the 1987 NDP convention

led Archer and Whitehorn to conclude the following:

- The delegate entitlement policy for NDP conventions, while giving labour a key presence, have not given them a domineering role;
- Labour delegates have been a substantial minority, overwhelmingly from Ontario, and have been mostly blue-collar workers or union representatives and are mostly male;
- In ideological terms, a majority of labour delegates saw themselves as socialist or social democrat, and as working class. Attitudes of union delegates were similar to those of non-union delegates, indicating no dramatic shift to the right.(58)

Thus, despite the critics, Archer and Whitehorn conclude that the views, values, and attitudes of the Labour representatives were similar to those of non-union Party members.

The differences between Labour and the NDP do not appear to be ideological, but why then has there been a great deal of tension between Labour and the NDP? According to Whitehorn, the reasons for tension stem from the differences in priorities between the two. Whitehorn elaborates on this point by posing the question: "Is free collective bargaining at the top of the rankings for both?(59) David Mackenzie argues that the labour movement is simply a coalition and "Coalitions will officially feign non-partisanship as they diligently scrutinize party utterances for signs of betrayal and bad faith."(60) Could Mackenzie's claim explain why the labour movement has been so vocally opposed to the NDP in Ontario after the government's decision to introduce social contract

legislation (Bill 48)? Although Bill 48 was strongly opposed by public sector unions, is it enough to destroy a relationship spanning over 30 years? Mackenzie states that the question which needs to be answered is: "Does the Canadian Labour movement orient its political activity through an electorally-competitive social democratic party or does it conceive itself as essentially a partner of extra-parliamentary social coalitions? Party politics or coalition politics?"(61)

Historically, there are numerous examples where it appeared that the labour movement acted as an interest group rather than an integral part of the NDP. Although the OFL report states: "We believed that within the New Democratic Party, we were part of a partnership of equals...,"(62) there are numerous examples where the Labour-NDP relationship has been a partnership between adversaries. For example, when the Liberal government imposed general wage controls to combat inflation the labour movement was outraged. However, the two NDP premiers at that time (Blakeney and Schreyer) supported the imposition of wage controls.(63) Alan Whitehorn argues that despite the unprecedented level of support earned by the NDP from the 1988 federal election, labour was extremely critical over how the campaign was run. Whitehorn notes that Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) president, Bob White, wrote a 7-page letter which described the election as "disastrous" and that

labour's "...financial and people support is accepted gratefully, but its ideas and leadership are completely ignored."(64) Labour's anger was centred on the NDP's refusal to focus chiefly on the Free Trade issue. Similarly, many labour leaders, such as Bob White, felt that labour's representation within the SEPC was inadequate during the 1988 campaign.

The real problem, however, is that labour acts simultaneously as both a partner of the NDP, as well as an interest group. As an interest group, labour articulates both non-political and political demands to various political parties and governments. As a co-founder of the NDP, labour articulates its views in order to influence the party's policies. Unfortunately, this already complicated arrangement becomes even more difficult to manage when the NDP is in power. This is because when in government the NDP assumes a managerial role while labour's role as an interest group does not change. Not surprisingly, NDP-labour relations have tended to sour when the NDP is the governing party.

The NDP's organizational structure, unfortunately, does not appropriately accommodate the fact that labour is both a co-founder and an interest group. This explains, in part, why very few union locals have actually affiliated with the NDP. Is there a way in which the NDP could allow labour to function more independently within the NDP? Obviously, with

under 3 percent of the labour movement affiliated to the party, the wide array of views held by labour throughout Canada are not being sufficiently heard.

The issue of voter support is also important in understanding Labour-NDP tension. Archer provides statistical data indicating that members from unions affiliated to the NDP have traditionally voted in greater numbers for the Liberal Party than they have for the NDP.(65) Likewise, non-affiliated union members have preferred the Liberal party over the NDP. Therefore, in terms of electoral support, labour has not been as valuable an ally for the NDP as might be desired. However, Archer is quick to point out that Labour's contributions in terms of money and personnel are significant. Trade union contributions are second only to that of individuals in terms of total party revenues.(66) Second, 552 Locals and 75.7% of all affiliated union members reside in Ontario.(67) Therefore, the NDP without the Labour movement in Ontario would be severely weakened in terms of revenues and personnel. A weakened Ontario branch of the NDP would severely limit the Party's chances of remaining a national party.

Despite tensions between the labour movement and the NDP, the repercussions of a split would be significant. Mackenzie states, "The health and survival of organized labour is closely bound up with the health of the democratic

left as a whole, in Canada and elsewhere...the Canadian labour movement needs the discipline of building a social democratic party..."(68) John Young argues that "The NDP grew out of the union of the western cooperative farm movement and the central Canadian labour movement. In spite of the tensions between different elements within the Party, this uneasy marriage still represents our greatest strength."(69) Therefore judging from the literature there appears general agreement that while the Labour-NDP relationship is a difficult one, ending this relationship would not benefit either the Party or the labour movement.

In order to understand NDP-labour relations in greater depth, and from the perspective of labour, a number of CAW discussion papers were reviewed. These discussion papers, presented at the CAW's 4th constitutional convention in Quebec City (August 23-25, 1994), included a variety of proposals which indicated a willingness by the CAW to transform itself and its relationship with the NDP. In a *Toronto Star* article, Tony Van Alphen described the CAW's convention as "confusing" and ambiguous with respect to the union's position over the NDP.(70) In fact, however, the CAW's position is similar to that of most NDP members. This is because both sides agree that it would not be advantageous for a formal split between the NDP and labour to occur.

The first discussion paper, titled *Where are the*

Changes in Our Union Taking Us?, is primarily a self re-examination of the union. The paper indicates the union's dissatisfaction with the NDP: "Precisely at a time when we so desperately need an effective political voice to articulate our needs and mobilize frustrations, the disappointing truth is that the NDP has not been up to the task."(71) Further, according to the paper, the fundamental strength of the union is that it has been built in the workplace. Consequently, the union has to be more active in the workplace and begin to play "...the leadership role in fighting for jobs," in what is described as "Movement Unionism"(72) Thus, the paper advocates a more active CAW that represents and protects all working people from governments who act in the interests of the corporate elite.

The second discussion paper, titled *Labour and Politics: Rethinking, Redefining, Rebuilding*, reviews Labour's relationship with the NDP. Emphasis is placed on the significance of the social contract legislation in Ontario as the main issue behind the union's re-examination of the Labour-NDP relationship. The discussion paper also addresses a number of questions:

- What's the alternative?
- Why did the Reform Party, so fundamentally opposed to the values and needs of organize working people, receive more votes from unionized workers than did the NDP during the 1993 election?
- Why are we (the left) rather than they (the right) on the defensive?

- Why in Ontario is the government / party not fighting against our powerful enemies?
- Why hasn't labour been able to deliver the vote? Are we just another interest group, concerned with elections to consolidate our own gains?
- Had we decided, in 1961, to work towards the long term building of a socialist constituency - rather than winning the next election - would we be better off politically than we are today?

The paper is critical of the Ontario NDP for "...sounding like other governments, making judgements based on expediency, and putting the main focus on the deficit."(73) Furthermore, the result of this action, in effect, shows the populace that the right is correct in its view that debt, deficit, and downsizing should be the government's priority. The Ontario government, instead of following the corporate agenda, should offer an alternative vision that could move people and unite them against the corporate elite. After all, according to the discussion paper, "The right has controlled the economic and social agenda for the last fifteen years. It has had its chance to try out solutions, and it has failed miserably."(74)

Several proposals of how the union could help revive the Party are addressed. First, educational programs need to be designed so that the public can better understand the labour movement. Second, union activity should be increased at the local level, in the community and community struggles. Third, the union should play a leadership role in taking on the economic and political establishments. Obviously, then, the CAW discussion papers indicate

dissatisfaction with the NDP. However, there does not appear to be an explicit declaration of disassociation with the federal party. The CAW discussion papers also indicate a commitment by the union to play a more active role in the community and in politics separate from the NDP.

The lack of political alternatives to the NDP, although significant, is not the only issue to be considered when looking at NDP-labour tensions. According to John Young, a rift between some private sector unions and public sector unions continues to deepen. Therefore, labour itself is divided with regard to its relationship with the NDP. In fact, many private sector unions affiliated to the NDP have no intention to alter their relationship with the Party. Referring to Tony Van Alphen's article, many private sector unions "...have indicated they will work actively for the party (The Ontario NDP) because of labor reforms and other legislation that help workers."(75) Even the OFL report, which was highly critical of the NDP, referred to Bill 40 (reform of the Ontario Labour Relations Act) as some of the most progressive labour legislation in North America.(76)

In *Rethinking our Mission in Ontario: A Discussion Paper for Union Leaders* (circulated at the August renewal conference - author unknown), there is a scathing report of the OFL's decision to alter its relationship with the NDP in Ontario. In this paper, the OFL is criticized for "quibbling" over unimportant issues at a time when the

Labour movement should be acting in "The larger interests of Ontario's working people."(77) The OFL's affixation on Bill 48 has weakened the labour movement's overall strength to fight against the corporate agenda. The real issues are defined in the paper as being free trade and unemployment: "The steep decline in employment in central Canada's private-sector manufacturing industries is paralleled by a steep decline in the position and strength of industrial unions."(78) The decline of industrial unions (private sector) explains why "...the noise that can be generated over relatively-recent public spending cutbacks and job reductions far exceeds what labour has been able to sustain over the more catastrophic and economically-debilitating losses in mines, paper mills, appliance plants, and clothing manufacturers over the past decade and a half."(79) Thus, in addition to differences in priorities between labour and the NDP, there is also a difference in priorities between some private and public sector unions.

In fact, the report describes the divide between public and private sector unions in the movement as deep: "The CAW-public sector alignment is a formidable, commanding presence, and increasingly its political interests and policy views differ sharply with the rest of the large goods-and-service unions..."(80) The CAW-public sector alignment is accused of being uninterested in thinking about new strategies for creating public wealth and increasing

industrial activity. Rather, according to the report, "those organizations (public sector unions) are more interested in ...defend-the-status quo-at-all-costs approach to their sector..."(81) Instead, the CAW-public sector alliance should consider strengthening its alliance with the NDP rather than trying to break Labour's formal linkage with the party: "Political renewal is only possible, re-energizing social democracy is only possible, if labour takes a good hard look at itself."(82)

Leo Gerard, International Secretary - Treasurer - of the United Steelworkers of America argues that labour's relationship with the NDP should continue. He contends that to respond effectively to the right wing, labour must, instead of criticizing the NDP, maintain its commitment to the Party and develop further electoral strategies.(83). Gerard is critical of others who have withdrawn their support of provincial NDP governments. His message, therefore, is one of unity in order to effectively counter the powerful neo-conservative forces.

Eugene Kostyra, explains that when the NDP was formed there were very few union members in public sector unions that were in the CLC.(84) The various provincial components of what is now the National Union of Public and General Workers were not part of the CLC at that time. As a result, "Today a large majority of union members belong to those public sector unions which do nct have many local unions

affiliated to the NDP."(85) Further, when the NDP is elected to govern, the NDP becomes the employer of these non- affiliated public sector unions and subsequently the potential for conflict (ie. Bill 48) increases dramatically when the government is faced with difficult fiscal constraints. Kostyra believes that the relationship between public sector unions and the NDP could be strengthened by including more union members in the Party. However, given the current relationship, it seems highly unlikely that public sector unions and their members would enthusiastically join the NDP. First, the Labour movement itself, which appears fragmented between the CAW and public sector unions versus private sector unions, must agree amongst themselves on a united strategy before there can be any strengthening of ties between the Party and Labour. Second, if the divisions between some private and public sector unions intensify, how will the Party bridge the gap between the two or will it, in fact, have to choose sides between two substantively different ideological views?(86)

Alan Whitehorn asks, "Is a new party system emerging? If so, what should the role of labour be in the newly emerging party system?"(87) Whitehorn looks at a number of issues which must be examined before making a decision over whether greater labour participation is plausible or desirable. Like Kostyra, Whitehorn is inclined to believe that greater union involvement within the Party is

necessary. Greater involvement in terms of union personnel at NDP conventions, in constituency ridings, and on the SEPC must be considered. As Whitehorn points out: "It is a curious fact in a party co-founded by the labour movement that no labour leader has run for the leadership of the NDP."(88)

Conclusion of Literature Review

The literature which was reviewed uncovered a number of issues relevant to the NDP-labour relationship. The disappointing electoral result in 1993 has forced New Democrats and labour to recognize past mistakes, while looking to possible solutions for rebuilding the party in the future. The literature review clearly demonstrated that many segments within the labour movement have become increasingly dissatisfied with their role and influence within the NDP. A variety of perspectives have been presented from party members, academics, and labour leaders. Judging from the literature reviewed, there appears to be little agreement with regard to the future status of the NDP-Labour relationship. Must this relationship be changed, maintained, or ended?

It is important to note that missing in the literature review are the views of rank and file trade unionists. Not surprisingly, this apparent failure to listen to their own members' views on political issues partially explains why

labour leaders have had very little impact on the voting behaviour of their members. As well, the NDP in the 1990s has driven away many of its supporters because of its inability to formulate a coherent and workable political program.

The literature review clearly uncovered evidence which suggests that the organizational structure of the NDP has contributed to the party's electoral decline and its souring relationship with labour. The viability of the NDP's integrated structure, its financial structure, and its rules dictating policy development are all suspect and warrant further investigation. The following chapters, therefore, will address these problems and from them construct an alternative, and more practical, organizational model for the NDP.

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THE 1993 FEDERAL ELECTION

CHAPTER THREE

The serious decline of the federal NDP during the 1993 campaign has required the party to re-examine itself. Certainly, there are many factors responsible for the NDP's decline. Some people, such as Howard Pawley and Judy Rebick, have argued that the NDP failed miserably in 1993 because it was seen as simply another traditional party, no different than the Conservatives or the Liberals. Still others, such as Steven Langdon, have suggested that the federal NDP failed to gather any momentum during the campaign because of unpopular provincial NDP governments in British Columbia and Ontario. Additionally, it has been argued by Alan Whitehorn that the party did poorly because it had to contend with right-wing populism (the Reform Party) not seen since the Social Credit Party during the early eighties.

Indeed, there are many factors which help to explain why the NDP performed so poorly in 1993. This chapter, however, will argue that there were two critical factors responsible for the NDP's poor showing in 1993. The first was the NDP's attempts to obtain the support of labour leaders and their respective organizations. Labour, after all, pressured the federal NDP to focus on the free trade issue in 1993 even though it was not a major concern of the

voting public.(1) Second, the NDP's organizational structure also contributed to its electoral shortcomings in 1993. The NDP's integrated structure meant that the Federal Party was burdened by the records of unpopular NDP governments in Ontario and British Columbia. In Ontario the impact of the Rae government's passage of its social contract legislation severely damaged NDP-labour relations at a time when the Federal Party needed labour's dollars, its organizational expertise, and its people.

Relying primarily on newspaper articles and data compiled from *The 1993 Canadian Election Study,* by David A. Northrup and Anne E. Oram, this chapter will show that the NDP's platform managed to turn away union and non-union voters alike in droves. As well, it is also important to review newspaper articles during the campaign period to illustrate what issues were being conveyed to the voters by the NDP. *The 1993 Canadian Election Study,* by Northrup and Oram, has been chosen because it includes three surveys which were conducted during the election campaign with a large sample size of 3,775 participants.(2) Additional literature, including *The Canadian General Election of 1993,* by Frizzell, Pammett and Westell, were also used in order fill any remaining gaps. Before discussing the 1993 election, however, a brief account of the factors which have influenced voting behaviour in Canada will be presented as an important background for this chapter. To illustrate the

uniqueness of voting behaviour in Canada, comparisons with culturally similar states will be presented as well.

Voting Behaviour

The factors which have influenced voting behaviour have been truly unique to Canada when compared to other liberal democratic states. Specifically, in most other countries social class has been a key determinant influencing voting behaviour.(3) Even when compared to other Anglo-American countries, which are culturally similar to Canada, social class plays a very marginal role in shaping voting behaviour in Canada.(4) Unlike Canada, in Great Britain and Australia, the British Labour Party (BLP) and the Australian Labour Party (ALP) are solidly linked to the working class segment of society. The BLP, however, has enjoyed the highest level of class voting. In Australia the party's deep historic roots have made it the party of choice not only of the working class, but of the middle class as well. As Robert Alford points out, "From the beginning of Australia as a nation in 1901, the Labor Party has existed as a political force and has therefore shaped the political traditions of Australia..."(5) Based upon a number of class voting studies, Alford contends that amongst Anglo-American states, Great Britain has the highest level of class voting, followed by Australia in second place, the United States third, and Canada fourth.(6)

There are many reasons why there has been a particularly low degree of class consciousness exhibited by Canadians. The first is that Canada's geographic size has traditionally meant that voting behaviour has often been determined by regional considerations. An Albertan, for example, employed in the oil industry would more likely be concerned over oil prices than a Newfoundlander earning a similar income employed in the fishing industry. Canadian political parties recognizing that regional diversity plays a key part in influencing voting behaviour have operated on brokerage principles. In other words, parties attempt to create a coalition of various interests during election time. Traditionally, although not exclusively, this has been reflected by the Liberal Party's success in Quebec and in many urban centres in Ontario, whereas the Conservatives have fared better in rural Ontario and the West. As for the NDP, it has enjoyed limited success in Western Canada, particularly in Saskatchewan and British Columbia. It is important to note that the federal NDP, despite all its efforts, has been unable to make significant gains in Central and Eastern Canada.

The second major determinant influencing voting behaviour in Canada has been ethnicity. Quebecers, for example, have tended to vote solidly for one party during federal elections. Since the time of Wilfrid Laurier up until the Trudeau era, Quebecers voted solidly for the

Liberal Party (1896 to 1984).(7) Suddenly, and quite dramatically, the Conservatives led by a Quebecer, Brian Mulroney, were able to win an overwhelming majority of Quebec seats in 1984. Mulroney's success in Quebec can be attributed to his alliance with many Quebec nationalists and specifically with his promise to amend the Constitution in a manner that would satisfy Quebec's constitutional demands. In 1988, the Conservatives were able to repeat their strong showing, winning 60 of 72 seats in Quebec. However, the death of the Meech Lake Accord coupled with its unpopular successor, the Charlottetown Accord, drove many of the Conservatives' former Quebec allies away. Under the leadership of a former Mulroney Cabinet Minister, Lucien Bouchard, many Quebec nationalists created the Bloc Québécois which went on to win 54 seats in the 1993 federal election. Incidently, the dramatic rise witnessed by the Conservatives in Quebec during the eighties was matched by the party's fall in the 1990s. The Tories won only one seat there in 1993.

In addition to regional and ethnic influences, voting behaviour in Canada has been influenced, to a lesser degree, by gender, age, religion, and between rural and urban populations.(8) Clearly, then, there are many determinants which influence voting behaviour other than social class. As a result, the NDP has been unsuccessful in its attempts to attract the majority of so-called "ordinary" Canadians.

Table 3.1 shows that during the 1988 federal election, most Canadians who considered themselves as working-class, voted for the Conservative Party rather than for the NDP. The table also shows that only 16.4 percent of those individuals who considered themselves as middle-class voted for the NDP, compared to 50.9 percent for the Conservatives. Similarly, table 3.2 shows that during the 1988 federal election, the NDP finished a distant third to both the Conservatives and the Liberals as the party of choice amongst Canadians with family incomes below 25,000.

Table 3.1

Subjective Social Class and Vote in the 1988 Federal Election

	Middle Class	Working Class
Total	73.2%	26.8%
Liberal	27.3	26.1
PC	50.9	39.8
NDP	16.4	29.5
Other	5.3	4.6

Source: Walter L. White, Ronald H. Wagenberg and Ralph Nelson, *Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government*, sixth edition (Canada: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994), p.137.

Table 3.2

Family Income and Vote in the 1988 Federal Election

	Less Than $10 000	$10 000-25 000	$25 000 50 000	Over $50 000
Total	7.4%	29.8%	44.9%	17.9%
Liberal	32.0	27.6	26.8	26.3
PC	46.7	48.2	45.6	56.3
NDP	15.5	19.6	21.6	14.7
Other	5.8	4.6	6.0	2.7

Source: Walter L. White, Ronald H. Wagenberg and Ralph Nelson, *Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government*, sixth edition (Canada: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994), p.137.

As discussed in chapter one, rank and file trade unionists have not favoured the NDP over the Conservatives or the Liberals. In keeping with past trends, the NDP failed to attract the rank and file to vote for it during the 1988 election campaign. This happened despite the fact that the labour leadership had solidly backed the NDP during the campaign. As well, free trade, vehemently opposed by labour leaders, became the major issue of the 1988 election. Although the NDP did receive its highest level of support both in terms of popular vote and seats won (20.4% of the vote and 43 seats), more rank and file trade unionists voted Conservative or Liberal than they did for the NDP (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3

Family Member in Labour Union and Vote in the 1988 Federal Election

	Yes	No
Total	45.6%	54.4%
Liberal	26.6	29.3
PC	43.7	50.3
NDP	24.9	15.0
Other	4.8	5.5

Source: Walter L. White, Ronald H. Wagenberg, and Ralph Nelson, *Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government*, sixth edition (Canada: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994), p.137.

Not surprisingly, then, the NDP was not the party of choice for the rank and file in 1993 as well. The difference, unfortunately for the NDP, was that with the entrance of the Reform Party and Bloc Québécois, it was no longer the only viable alternative to the Conservatives and the Liberals. In other words, the NDP lost its monopoly, and consequently its image, as a protest party challenging the other two traditional parties. This would have major implications for the NDP in 1993, especially in the West where Reform became its most serious opponent.

Many academics, most notably Brodie and Jenson, have argued that the NDP has failed to secure working class support because it has not challenged the conventional definition of politics as defined by the Liberals and the Conservatives.(9) Consequently, this has meant that the politics of regionalism and ethnicity, rather than class,

have continued to prevail in Canada. Brodie and Jenson's assessment, however, is exaggerated. It assumes that a political party is capable of shaping the long-term values of a heterogenous and regionally diverse country. Even in many western European states, where there has been a much higher level of class consciousness, this has occurred because of Europe's feudal roots and the homogeneity of most European states. Lipset points out that: "Religious and ethnic differences...have correlated with socioeconomic divisions, so that there has been an admixture of class and ethnic support."(10) The absence of religious and aristocratic privilege combined with the notion that social mobility is possible has clearly inhibited the development of class awareness in Canada. In short, political parties reflect the views and values of society rather than vice versa. If they choose not to reflect or articulate clearly those views and values, they will not be as electorally successful as planned.

As for the federal NDP, the majority of its support and seats have traditionally come from the rural regions of Western Canada, rather than from industrial workers. Many of these people are self-employed farmers, not employees, and in many cases they are, in fact, employers. Hence, the NDP, unlike many other sccial democratic parties has been largely dependent on the *petit bourgeois* for its support. This explains, in part, why the party has never challenged

private ownership or aroused class consciousness, preferring instead to focus on the redistribution of wealth within the capitalist system.

The fact that the NDP is made up of a coalition of various interests further restricts the party's ability to formulate a coherent political platform. More often than not, these competing interests collide with one another. For example, the NDP has traditionally received support from labour and many environmental groups. Should the party then support further logging projects in environmentally sensitive areas which create jobs and steady employment for union workers? Or, should the NDP support the preservation of Canada's forests to appease the environmentalists? These difficulties are only further complicated for the federal NDP because it has to devise an electoral strategy which addresses the concerns, and sometimes conflicting interests, which vary from region to region. Unfortunately, this has meant that the NDP was seriously inhibited in its ability to devise new policies during the 1993 election campaign. The party appeared satisfied to fight "against" change, such as proposals to reduce the deficit, instead of proposing any policy alternatives of its own. In the past, by either fighting against Liberal and Conservative policies, or defending the status quo, the party had been able to hold on to its loose coalition of supporters. However, economic recession and rising government debt and deficits in the

1990s made the NDP's calls for further spending on government programs increasingly unpopular among voters, including union members.

Although there is general agreement that the NDP must re-examine itself or face the possibility of political extinction, it appears that several key issues are being overlooked. The literature reviewed in chapter two shows that little has been said about reasons why rank and file trade unionists have not been voting for the NDP. Moreover, there is the inaccurate assumption that the political views of labour leaders are similar to the views of the rank and file. For example, Desmond Morton states that during the 1993 election "Provincial public sector workers in particular, many of them strong supporters of the NDP in the past, did not want to hear about recessions, deficits, rising health care costs or public opinion."(11) Using the *1993 Canadian Election Study,* this chapter will show that Morton's assessment is incorrect. Furthermore, it will be argued that if the NDP hopes to rebuild, it must devise a strategy that also addresses the concerns of the rank and file rather than just labour leaders.

The 1993 Election Campaign

With respect to labour-party relations, the federal NDP had several obstacles to overcome in 1993. First, just prior to the election campaign, there was dissention within

the party's caucus over its position toward the Rae government in Ontario. In the spring of 1993 Steven Langdon, MP for the Windsor riding of Essex-Windsor, criticized the Ontario NDP government's social contract legislation and Bob Rae's increasing concern over the province's deficit.(12) Langdon's criticism of Rae was not acceptable to Audrey McLaughlin and she stripped Langdon of his position as the party's finance critic for his statements. However, Langdon did secure the support of his own constituency's largest and most influential labour organization, the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW). The Langdon affair had a negative impact on overall NDP-labour relations. For many labour leaders, McLaughlin's failure to criticize the Rae government's social contract combined with her decision to strip Langdon of his duties as the party's finance critic only further complicated an already strained relationship between the party and labour.

Second, and more importantly, the federal party was prepared to follow labour's advice and focus on the issue of free trade. Clearly, table 3.4 shows that both union and non-union voters alike held negative views with regard to free trade.

Table 3.4

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES	Union	Non-Union
Support	34%	42%
Oppose	58	47

UNEMPLOYMENT HAS INCREASED BECAUSE OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENT	Union	Non-Union
Agree	69%	60%
Disagree	23	30

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (NAFTA)	Union	Non-Union
Support	23%	30%
Oppose	67	56

NEW AGREEMENT NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN POSITION	Union	Non-Union
Agree	29%	36%
Disagree	49	39

Source: The data comes from *The 1993 Canadian Election Study*

However, this issue was not considered very important to most of the electorate. In fact, when asked what the most important campaign issue was both union and non-union individuals responded that jobs (37% union, 30% non-union) were most important. Ranking second behind jobs amongst respondents was the deficit followed in third place by health care. Interestingly, of the 68 different issues

identified by the respondents, the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and NAFTA finished near the bottom of the list. Only 0.2 percent of union and 0.3 percent of all non-union respondents identified these two issues as being most important to them. Other studies, such as those found in *The Canadian General Election of 1993*, also show similar rankings as well.(13)

Obviously there was a clear division between labour leaders, who wanted free trade to be a major campaign issue, and the rank and file, who saw jobs, the deficit and health care as their greatest concerns. Rank and file trade unionists, after all, are also taxpayers, investors, and mortgage holders etc.. They, unlike their labour leaders, were concerned over a wide range of issues, all of which have an impact on their own financial situation. This separation between labour leaders and their members has always hurt the NDP electorally. In 1993, it devastated the party because it was no longer the only serious political alternative to the Liberals and the Conservatives.

With a political platform failing to address the key issues in the minds of most voters, the NDP stumbled through the 1993 election campaign. Consequently, press coverage for the party was also minimal and its popularity appeared stuck early into the campaign at around 10 percent. Unfortunately for the federal NDP, the Rae government in Ontario received a substantial amount of unfavourable press

coverage. With the election campaign only one day old, the *Toronto Star* reported that Rae's offers to help McLaughlin "...makes some of McLaughlin's labor supporters cringe, in the wake of Rae's social contract cuts."(14) In the same article Sid Ryan, Ontario division President of CUPE was quoted as saying: "The best thing Rae could do for Audrey is go up to his cottage and stay there for the duration of this election."(15) That same day, the *Windsor Star* reported that the Canadian Auto Workers intended to support the federal party despite its opposition to the Rae government. However, the paper also reported: "The big question is whether the foot soldiers of the labor movement will be able to bring much commitment and enthusiasm to the task, after the general disillusionment with Ontario's NDP government."(16) Therefore, in the first days of the election campaign, the press coverage received by the NDP was based as much on party-labour conflict at the provincial level, as on party-labour unity at the federal level.

The media continued to focus their coverage on labour-party conflict while tying these reports together to the federal party's election campaign. On September 11, 1993 the *Toronto Star* reported that Rae and McLaughlin agreed to fight against free trade.(17) However, in the same article McLaughlin's advice to Ontario unionists fighting Rae was that they "will have to sort it out with the Premier." McLaughlin's reluctance to comment on the Ontario

government's record only further discouraged union activists from helping the federal party.

During the second week of the campaign, the media continued to focus on how Rae's social contract with labour was having a negative impact on the federal party. The *Windsor Star* reported that Liz Barkley, head of the Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation, had indicated that there were fewer of her union activists helping the federal NDP in 1993 than in the past.(18) As well, the same article reported that Sid Ryan (Ontario head of CUPE) announced that his union would only donate money and personnel to individual NDP candidates rather than contributing funds directly to the federal party.

As for the campaign itself, the NDP continued to focus on the free trade issue. McLaughlin began stepping up her attacks on the Liberals because of Chretien's uncertain position on NAFTA.(19) Furthermore, the party's own television campaign ads focussed on free trade along with other issues such as health care and unemployment. Moreover, the ads ended with an anti-Ottawa statement: "Ottawa hasn't got the message - Send it. Vote NDP." Unfortunately, since the NDP was now seen as one of the three traditional parties its commercial ads were pushing potential NDP voters to the Reform Party instead of to the NDP.(20)

With ineffective campaign ads and a party platform not

addressing the key issues, support for the NDP continued to fall. By the third week of the campaign, CTV news reported that the NDP had the support of six percent of decided voters.(21) Faced with the possibility of falling below the 12 seats required to maintain official party status in the House of Commons, the NDP began looking for other campaign issues. McLaughlin began spending more time discussing the party's $15 billion, five year infrastructure program and its $4 billion proposed child care program. However, unlike the Liberals, these new spending programs were not being matched with a commitment to cut government spending, an issue that had been the second most important of the campaign.

Although most labour leaders did not favour deficit reduction by way of spending cuts, most of the rank and file did support such cuts. Even when asked about specific issues such as welfare and unemployment insurance, union members responded almost exactly as did non-union people in the survey (Table 3.5). Table 3.5 shows that both groups (union and non-union) supported at least some spending cuts to some previously "untouchable" programs, welfare and unemployment insurance. However, when questioned about what would happen to the deficit with an NDP victory (45% union, 46% non-union), most responded that the deficit would increase. By contrast, only a small percentage of respondents (12% union, 11% non-union) believed that the

deficit would decrease under an NDP government.(22)

Table 3.5

CUT SPENDING > WELFARE		
	Union	Non-union
A Lot	22%	21%
Some	48	47
Not At All	29	29
CUT SPENDING > UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE		
	Union	Non-union
A Lot	8%	10%
Some	46	45
Not At All	44	42

Source: The data comes from *The 1993 Canadian Election Study*.

Not surprisingly, when those participating in the survey were asked which party they would support, the NDP finished in fifth spot (table 3.6). Obviously, the party's stance on NAFTA and health care may have been well-received by labour leaders and other interest groups. However, the rank and file continued to leave the NDP for the Liberals, the Reform Party, and the Bloc Québécois. Since the Bloc ran candidates only in Quebec, the 12 percent union support received is in actual fact many times higher than that amount. For the NDP, however, the Reform Party's 10 percent support among the rank and file posed a far greater concern for it. The Reform Party was beginning to seriously challenge the NDP in all of the 19 seats that the party held

in British Columbia. Similarly, Reform's presence in Manitoba and Saskatchewan began to threaten NDP incumbents in these provinces as well. Although the NDP has never obtained significant rank and file trade union support, its 6 percent support among trade unionists (see table 3.6) was still only half of what the pro-NAFTA and generally unpopular Conservative Party received in the same survey.

Table 3.6

PARTY THINK WILL VOTE FOR

	Union	Non-Union
Conservative	12%	16%
Liberal	25	26
NDP	6	4
Reform	10	13
Bloc	12	7
Other	3	2

Source: *The 1993 Canadian Election Study.* Percentages do not add up to 100 because those respondents undecided or refusing to answer are not listed.

By week four of the election campaign, the NDP appeared stuck at about 6 percent support.(23) Instead of trying to secure the 12 seats needed to retain official party status, the NDP continued to try to win some seats in Ontario. For example, at a rally in Windsor, Ontario, McLaughlin described Langdon as one of "the most effective MPs in Ottawa."(24) This despite the fact that McLaughlin had stripped Langdon of his duties as finance critic prior to the campaign. The party also began placing more attention

on health care. The NDP's new political ads asked: "The Liberals let you down on free trade. Will they let you down on health care?"(25) The *Toronto Star* reported that McLaughlin referred to the protection of medicare and other social programs as the "fight of (her) life."(26)

McLaughlin's crusade, however, to save health care stalled badly from the very beginning. With less than two weeks remaining in the campaign, McLaughlin was seen discussing the importance of preserving health care while at one of the health centres facing a 4.4 percent cut in its $20 million annual budget by the Rae government.(27) The incident, well publicized by the media, further damaged the NDP's credibility on yet another election issue.

Shawn Mendes's report, printed just days before the election in the *Globe & Mail,* sums up best the disillusionment felt by many New Democrats over the party's electoral strategy. Referring to the NDP's political platform he argues the following:

> Policies such as these make federal NDP leader Audrey McLaughlin look like Alice in Wonderland - well intentioned, but also far from reality that Canadians cannot take her, or her party, seriously....The New Democrats could have seized the deficit as their issue. Debt-servicing redistributes tax dollars from working taxpayers to wealthy bondholders, many of whom are offshore; fighting the deficit therefore would be an egalitarian cause.(28)

Certainly, had the NDP been committed to fighting the deficit, it could have possibly stemmed the flow of many New

Democrats switching over to Reform in Western Canada. After all, a few years earlier Roy Romanow became the NDP premier of Saskatchewan by promising to balance his province's budget. However, federal party strategists understood that a campaign centring on deficit reduction would have angered many of Ontario's labour leaders, who were still fighting Rae over the social contract. Thus, the federal NDP's attempt to gain the support of labour leaders not only failed to lead to electoral support, it also hurt the party in the West where the majority of its incumbents were fighting for their political lives.

On election night, October 25th 1993, the NDP finished with 6.9 percent of the vote and just nine seats.(29) In Ontario, the party failed to win a single seat after sending ten New Democrats to Ottawa in 1988. One blue-collar riding after another in Ontario fell to the Liberals on election night. The ridings of Nickel Belt, Sault Ste. Marie, Thunder Bay - Atikokan and Timmins - Chapleau went decisively Liberal. In the working-class riding of Oshawa, more voters preferred the Reform Party than the NDP.(30) Interestingly, even Steven Langdon lost in his riding of Essex-Windsor. Langdon, the first New Democrat MP to publicly criticize Rae's social contract, had received solid labour backing from the powerful Canadian Auto Workers. Langdon's loyalty to his labour allies, however, did not prevent him from being defeated. In fact, his Liberal

opponent defeated him by a margin of nearly two to one.(31) Certainly, Langdon's defeat illustrates that labour's dollars and campaign assistance alone could not have saved the NDP in Ontario.

Conclusion

During the 1993 election campaign the NDP's political platform offered little to interest the rank and file to vote for it. In the past, the NDP could have simply retained its core base of support by fighting for more social programs or condemning corporate profits. This, however, was no longer the case by 1993. Union and non-union voters alike were fearful for their jobs and concerned about Canada's ballooning debt. Instead of listening to the concerns of the voter, the NDP preferred to devise an unimaginative and safe political strategy, so as not to offend its allies in the labour movement as well as other special interest groups. As a result, the NDP stumbled through the 1993 election campaign still opposing free trade, often defending the status quo, and promising even more costly government programs.

The NDP, obviously, believed that it would have been politically advantageous to forge ties with organized labour, ignoring the fact that labour leaders have historically failed to influence the voting behaviour of their members. On the other hand, public-sector unions and

the CAW were less than enthusiastic in their support for the federal NDP. These unions openly questioned their support for the party during the 1993 election campaign. Although the private-sector unions continued to fully support the federal party, their size and strength could not make up the void left by the public-sector unions. The dismal electoral showing by the NDP in 1993 has finally forced the party and organized labour to seriously re-assess their relationship with one another.

Finally, it is obvious that the Federal Party was handicapped during the 1993 federal election because of its integrated structure. Financial contributions to the Federal Party were reduced because donations to the party's provincial wings had steadily declined as a result of the unpopularity of several provincial NDP governments. Additionally, party activists, including trade unionists and other NDP supporters, were shying away from the Federal Party because of its close organizational relationship with its unpopular provincial wings. Lastly, throughout the election, the Federal Party could not articulate its program because of the controversy it was forced to address surrounding the Rae government's social contract legislation in Ontario.

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NDP-LABOUR RELATIONS AFTER 1993

CHAPTER FOUR

Since the 1993 federal election, New Democrats have been reevaluating their ties with organized labour. Labour, too, has been eager to redefine its place in politics. The divisions which exist within the labour movement and within the NDP, however, have only further complicated a very difficult renewal process. For example, private sector unions have continued to view the NDP as a valuable ally. On the other hand, the CAW and the public-sector unions have sought alternative political strategies. As for the NDP, there are many who believe that the party's ties with labour are outdated and detrimental. Still, there are others within the party who believe that the continuation of NDP-labour relations is vital for the party's long-term political survival.

When examining NDP-labour relations during the post-1993 period, it is first necessary to look at the records of Canada's provincial NDP governments. This is because the NDP is an integrated party, meaning that there is no clear separation between the party's federal and provincial wings. Moreover, because the majority of labour related legislation falls under provincial jurisdiction, it is often the legislative objectives of provincial NDP governments which have shaped NDP-labour relations. This also explains, in

part, why labour has set up its own federations along provincial lines.

Based upon the performances of provincial NDP governments in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Ontario, it will be argued that it remains politically advantageous for labour to support the NDP. Moreover, this chapter will show that as long as the CAW and the public-sector unions continue to distance themselves from the NDP, they threaten to lose their ability to influence public policy. As for the NDP, it will be argued that it must pursue a political agenda which balances the interests of labour with the values and concerns of the majority of Canadians. To successfully accomplish this task, it will be argued that the NDP must make a number of structural changes. The structural changes proposed in this chapter include transforming the NDP into a confederal party, increasing labour's participation within the party, and allowing for the admission of cross-regional factions. Goldman's transaction theory, moreover, will be employed to help explain how these changes can enhance the effectiveness of NDP-labour relations in the future.

The Social Contract: The NDP-Labour relationship in Crisis

In the summer of 1994, the CAW announced that it was withdrawing its support for the NDP in Ontario.(1) The CAW's decision was in response to the Rae government's

decision to pass the Social Contract Act (Bill 48). The social contract was criticized by both the CAW and the public sector unions because it legislated a unilateral roll-back of existing collective agreements.(2) More seriously, these unions felt betrayed by a government which they helped to elect in 1990. Reflecting this sense of betrayal, the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) argued that Rae's social contract "ensured reassessment" of its relationship with the NDP.(3) Although there was a great deal of criticism expressed by labour over the social contract, not all labour organizations were as eager to criticize the Rae government. In fact, during both the 1993 federal election and the 1995 Ontario provincial election, the majority of private sector unions continued to endorse the NDP.

The divisions which have existed within the labour movement, over the issue of whether or not to support the NDP, have had a significant impact on overall labour unity. The issue has caused rifts between union locals and their national councils, it has also caused serious divisions within the OFL, and it has similarly threatened the cohesiveness of the CLC. Within the labour movement two opposing camps have emerged. The first is comprised of Canada's largest private sector union, the CAW, and the majority of public sector unions. The second is led by the Steelworkers and includes a number of other large labour

organizations including the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, and various other union organizations and union locals.(4)

In addition to viewing the social contract as an assault on existing public sector agreements, the CAW and the public sector unions believed that it placed the blame for Ontario's deficit on the backs of public sector workers. According to one CAW discussion paper "...the government soon began sounding like other governments, making judgements based on expediency, and putting the main focus on the deficit," and "The NDP was essentially teaching the most dangerous lesson of all: there is nothing we can really do; the right is right."(5) In other words, the CAW accused the Rae government of accepting a neo-conservative notion that the size of government had to be reduced. In fact, however, the social contract was an attempt by the Rae government to save jobs, thereby preserving the size of the provincial bureaucracy.

Jim Stanford, an economist for the CAW has argued that government deficits and accumulated debt are major problems. However, he contends that it was a problem brought about by neo-conservative fiscal policy, not because of public sector wages.(6) He also points out that fighting the deficit on the backs of workers or by cutting social programs are meaningless and unacceptable. Instead, he contends, changes

in neo-conservative fiscal policy must be made in order to reduce government deficits. The NDP's unwillingness to challenge the existing workings of the free-market economy has led Stanford to conclude that the party offers little more than "Neo-Liberalism Light".(7) Consequently, he has criticized NDP governments for their handling of the current economic crisis. Specifically, Stanford accuses provincial NDP governments of promising the same solutions as other pro-business governments. The only apparent difference, however, is that the NDP has presented itself as a party that could somehow implement spending cuts in a fairer and more humane manner.(8)

Stanford's explanation of why government deficits and debt have become such a large problem does have its merits. Indeed, pursuing fiscal policy which ensures high interest rates as a method to curb inflationary pressures leads to an increase in interest payments required to service government debt. As well, high interest rates reduce consumer demand for goods because the cost of borrowing money becomes too high in relation to inflation. The overall impact of reducing consumer demand to combat inflation has led to significant layoffs in those sectors which produce consumer goods. Unfortunately, this has also meant that many of the former taxpayers and consumers, now unemployed, become dependent on the state in order to survive. This increase in the demand for social assistance has only added another

financial burden for governments to contend with.

Certainly, drastic changes in fiscal policy need to be made. However, because such fiscal changes can only occur at the federal level, it is unfair to condemn provincial NDP governments for a lack of action. During the 1995 Ontario provincial election, for example, Hargrove had been quoted as saying: "...the only way to reduce government debt effectively is to lower interest rates. High rates only help international investors.."(9) Therefore, the CAW's criticism of the Rae government was seriously misguided because it condemned the government for not acting on issues which it, in fact, had no jurisdictional control over. This leads to an important question: Even though the Rae government's social contract undermined collective bargaining agreements, should the CAW and the public sector unions have withdrawn their support for the NDP in Ontario? Instead of abandoning the NDP, the CAW and public sector unions should have continued to support the NDP in public, while working behind closed doors to work out more acceptable public sector agreements. Such an alternative strategy would have had both short-term and long-term advantages.

In the short-term, continued support for the NDP could have helped the federal party during the 1993 election campaign. In 1988, for instance, the NDP received 24.9 percent of the union vote. However, in 1993 the NDP

received only 6 percent of the vote from unionized workers, a decline of 18.9 percent. As well, the federal NDP was constantly pressured by labour to respond and somehow resolve the controversial social contract issue. More seriously, during the 1995 Ontario provincial election, the CAW and the public sector unions' unwillingness to help the NDP only contributed to the election of a right-wing government which promised to make substantial cuts in the public sector.

In the long-term, continued support for the NDP could have led to the development of alternative economic strategies with which labour could have been directly involved. After all, it was the Rae government which passed Bill 40, considered by the labour movement as one of the most progressive pieces of labour legislation in North America.(10) Similarly, with labour as an ally, rather than a foe, it could have worked with the NDP to build and improve upon other pieces of legislation, such as pay equity and employment equity. Instead, the CAW and its public sector allies have chosen to work outside Canada's social democratic party.

In contrast, the private-sector unions, led by the Steelworkers, have chosen to remain supportive of the NDP. Unlike the public sector unions and the CAW, they favour working with the NDP to develop alternative economic strategies, including a reduced work week, co-ownership, and

a greater say in training and management decisions.(11) Furthermore, among the private sector unions there is a general acceptance that tough budgetary decisions have to be made.(12) In response to the CAW and the public sector unions position towards the NDP, Leo Gerard has argued: "Surely there are more effective ways of responding to this crisis than with empty rhetoric and withdrawing of support for provincial NDP governments."(13) Clearly, the rift between the CAW-public sector unions, and the private sector unions cannot be underestimated. Interestingly, however, during the Ontario election campaign both the CAW and certain public sector unions softened their position when it became frighteningly clear that the Tories were poised to win the provincial election.

The 1995 Ontario Provincial Election

The defeat of the Ontario NDP government on June 8, 1995 provides important lessons for both the NDP and the labour movement. It illustrates that fighting with one another does nothing to advance the objectives of either side. The NDP clearly underestimated the impact that opening public sector agreements would have on party-labour relations. However, labour should have accepted the fact that the government's deficit had ballooned and immediate measures were necessary. Unfortunately, in November 1993 the OFL, under tremendous pressure from the CAW and the

public sector unions, demanded that the Rae government repeal Bill 48.(14) It also suggested that the labour movement develop alternative political strategies, including developing broad based social coalitions to influence all governments.(15) Behind the scenes, though, the OFL was deeply divided. More specifically, within the OFL the majority of private sector unions had supported an alternative resolution which would have endorsed the NDP despite the social contract.

Meanwhile, the tensions between the public sector unions and the NDP continued to mount. On the one hand, there were the public sector unions who felt betrayed by the Rae government. On the other hand, there was an inexperienced NDP government scrambling to deal with a recession that it had greatly underestimated. When the government announced that Ontarians would be going to the polls on June 8, 1995 labour was left in a difficult position: It could support the NDP in its bid to be re-elected, or it could watch the party be defeated by political opponents committed to implementing deep budgetary cuts and massive layoffs in the public sector.

Almost immediately labour appeared to be softening its position with regard to the NDP. Although it never did officially endorse the party during the campaign, CAW president Buzz Hargrove was quoted as saying: "Bay Street will be screaming...They will do everything they can to

ensure the NDP's defeat."(16) Moreover, OFL president Gordon Wilson announced that he was personally supporting the Rae government despite his federation's refusal to officially endorse the party.(17)

Interestingly, while many labour leaders were disappointed by the Rae government's performance, an Environics poll released on April 20, 1995 showed that most Ontarians thought that women's groups, the poor, and labour unions had been the primary beneficiaries of the NDP government.(18) The same poll also showed that 56 percent of middle-class Ontarians strongly disagreed or disagreed that the Rae government represented them.(19) In addition, the poll showed that Ontarians wanted the government's top priorities to be promoting economic growth (32%), reducing the provincial deficit (28%), and maintaining social and health programs (17%).(20) Obviously, while Rae's social contract isolated many of the NDP's traditional labour supporters, it was still seen by most Ontarians as a party which represented labour's interests. Furthermore, the Rae government's attempt to fight the deficit was seen as a half-hearted attempt to curb spending by those who wouldn't have voted NDP anyway.

In addition to budgetary problems, the NDP had to contend with a sluggish economy. Those on the right blamed NDP programs and policies, such as the jobsOntario training program, employment equity, and the government's anti-scab

legislation for Ontario's poor economic performance. Instead of directing its criticism towards federal fiscal policies, the disgruntled left chose to blame the Rae government. Consequently, attacks from both the left and the right only further reduced the Rae government's credibility insofar as being capable of managing the economy. To complicate matters further for the NDP, many labour leaders in the public sector, such as Sid Ryan, CUPE's Ontario president, warned during the election campaign: "If the NDP wins, I expect there will be a move by labor to start a new party."(21) Private sector unions, however, continued to remain loyal to Rae. In fact, the party reported that it was 20 percent better financed from unions in 1995, than it had been in 1990.(22)

With less than three weeks remaining in the campaign, serious cracks began to emerge at the highest levels of the OFL. Julie Davis, OFL secretary-treasurer and former CUPE member announced that she intended to run against Gord Wilson for the federation's presidency.(23) Relations between the two had reportedly soured when Wilson announced his support for the Rae government. While labour remained divided, an Angus Reid Poll released May 27 placed the Tories in the lead with 39 percent support, the Liberals with 35 percent support, and the NDP with 21 percent support.(24) As it became increasingly clear that the Tories were poised to win the election, many union locals

broke ranks with their national organizations. Moreover, even those unions which continued to oppose Rae began warning of unrest if the next government intended to repeal Bill 40 (labour legislation which banned the use of replacement workers and made it easier for workers to organize). With a week remaining in the campaign, a number of CAW locals were actively campaigning for the NDP. Gabe MacNally, vice-president for CAW local 199 in St. Catharines, for example, referred to Hargrove's refusal to endorse the NDP in the following manner: "As a responsible leader, I think there's no option but for him to come out and support the NDP in this campaign."(25) As well, despite Sid Ryan's threats to establish a labour party if the NDP was re-elected, John Murphy of CUPE local 1000 (at Ontario Hydro) announced that he was advising his members to vote NDP.(26) Moreover, the CLC's president Bob White also announced that he was endorsing the NDP. On election night, however, the Conservatives won a convincing majority government with a platform which promised massive layoffs in the public sector, drastic cuts in government spending, and lower taxes.

In response to the NDP's electoral defeat, Paul McKeague argues in his insightful article: "Solidarity will bloom once more as labor defends the poor, denounces injustice, chats catchy slogans against tax breaks for the rich and feels good about itself again."(27) He continues

by adding: "Labor has never had such a sympathetic ear at Queen's Park, but the Rae government's modest achievements fell far short of the socialist Valhalla that danced in the heads of many of its labor supporters."(28) Unfortunately, the decision by public sector union leaders to oppose Rae will have significant long-term implications for their members. For example, instead of unpaid days off and wage roll-backs, many public sector workers will receive their layoff notices. Instead of pay equity, women will continue to make less than their male counterparts. Instead of employment equity, visible minorities, women, the disabled and aboriginal peoples will once again have to compete in an environment that has traditionally discriminated against them. As well, many constituencies with large unionized populations no longer have access to MPPs sympathetic to labour issues. For example, the NDP lost three of its four seats in Hamilton and two of its three seats in Windsor. In Oshawa NDP incumbent Allan Pilkey lost his seat by a margin of nearly two to one to his Progressive Conservative opponent.(29)

A Formula For Success: The NDP in Saskatchewan

In the midst of a number of devastating electoral setbacks suffered by the NDP at the federal level and in Ontario, one NDP government continued to enjoy considerable success. On June 21, 1995 the Saskatchewan NDP government,

led by Premier Roy Romanow, won its second straight majority government. Roy Romanow's success can be traced to his government's determination to get the province's spending under control. In fact, Romanow's government was the first in Canada to balance its budget in the 1990s.(30) Indeed, some controversial decisions had to be made. The government not only increased taxes, it also cut spending by eliminating many rural hospitals. During the 1995 election campaign, Romanow made no apologies for his government's commitment to deficit fighting: "I have no time for somebody who says that the debt is all a fiction."(31) Romanow's commitment to cut spending was extremely successful. The province's deficit went from $840 million in 1991 to a budget surplus of $119 million in 1995.(32)

The NDP's success in Saskatchewan paralleled closely the demise of the Rae government in Ontario. Why had Romanow triumphed while Rae had failed? First, Romanow had promised during the 1991 election campaign to balance the province's budget. By contrast, Rae promised to stimulate a sluggish Ontario economy by increasing government spending. Unfortunately for Rae, his government's deficit spending failed to lift Ontario's economy out of the recession. As a result, his party's critics were quick to attack the NDP as fiscally incompetent. Nevertheless, the mandates of the two governments were very different. However, while Rae backed down from many of his promises, Romanow did not deviate from

his. Consequently, Rae's government lacked the credibility enjoyed by Romanow's government.

The Romanow government also continued to receive strong labour backing. Some critics have even accused the Romanow government of favouring unionized contractors for government contracts even if it had meant paying a higher price.(33) Moreover, unlike the NDP government in Ontario, Saskatchewan's NDP government enjoys strong grass-roots support built up over many years when the party has held power. In fact, the province elected the country's first CCF government in 1944, and since that time has dominated Saskatchewan politics. In Ontario, however, the NDP had to contend with a hostile and powerful business community which blamed it for the province's economic problems and skyrocketing debt.

NDP-Labour Relations: British Columbia

In British Columbia, the NDP has maintained good relations with labour. Although opinion polls in 1995 placed Premier Mike Harcourt's government in third place, this was largely due to the numerous scandals which have plagued his government.(34) The Harcourt government has passed numerous pieces of pro-labour legislation, including most recently in 1995 the Employment Standards Act. This Act includes a number of guidelines that employers must follow in the workplace. For example, employers are

required to register employees working in private residences to ensure that the minimum standards of the Act are enforced.(35) As well, the Act guarantees rest and meal breaks for employees working more than five hours in any given day.(36)

In addition to the Employment Standards Act, the Harcourt government has also raised the province's minimum wage. As a result, it continues to receive support from the B.C. Federation of Labour, as well as from the public sector unions.(37) The B.C. Government and Service Employees Union (BCGEU), for example, remains a staunch supporter of the Harcourt government.

Why did British Columbia's NDP government continue to receive backing from the province's public sector unions? The most obvious answer is that the Harcourt government did not unilaterally open existing collective agreements of public sector workers. Beneath the surface, however, there is another explanation. There are in fact clear ideological differences between British Columbia's public sector unions and their counterparts in Ontario. During a CBC interview in May 1995, John Shields, president of the B.C. Government and Service Employees Union, argued that labour should continue to support the NDP despite the social contract.(38) He also described the divisions between labour and the NDP as "sad" and urged those unions opposing the NDP to cooperate with the party.(39) Interestingly, during the

same interview, Shields warned that when BC's unions went against Dave Barrett's NDP government the result was that they indirectly helped to elect a "severe" right-wing government.(40) When Mike Darnell from CAW Local 444 in Windsor pointed out that his union was not providing money to the Ontario NDP, Shields responded by asking Darnell, "What other instrument in parliament do you have to push the trade union agenda?"(41)

Clearly, British Columbia's public sector unions share a view similar to Ontario's private sector unions with regard to NDP-labour relations. First, they both recognize that labour's interests cannot be better served by the NDP's political opponents. Second, they do not see how diverting money away from the NDP towards extra-parliamentary coalitions instead can help labour's interests. Third, and finally, both recognize that fighting the NDP, even if it means indirectly helping to elect right-wing governments, is highly detrimental to labour's interests.

The Future of NDP-Labour Relations

Although there are many obstacles which need to be overcome, rehabilitating NDP-labour relations must be a top priority for both the party and the labour movement. Certainly, the conditions for better relations exist. The federal Liberals' fiscal and monetary policies have proven to be little different than their predecessors, as far as

labour is concerned. The separatist Bloc Québécois is the official opposition in Canada, and Parliament's third largest party is more right-wing than the governing party. In Ontario, the Rae government was defeated by a pro-business government committed to repealing some of what labour would consider as the country's most progressive legislation. Additionally, the new government in Ontario has already begun a process of slashing government spending for welfare and subsidized housing, which many union leaders could only describe as unacceptable.

Before improved relations between the NDP and the labour movement can be realized, however, labour must first overcome its internal divisions. A labour movement divided can do little to advance the interests of its members. Canada's largest private sector union, the CAW, and its public sector allies should not abandon the NDP. Although both the CAW and the public sector unions have already committed themselves to participating in extra-parliamentary social coalitions, this approach without continued support for the NDP will reap few benefits.

As for the NDP, the debate over labour's value as an ally has been hotly contested at the party's renewal conferences. In an article submitted at the NDP's December 1994 renewal conference, John Richards argues the following: "It is simply not credible that a social democratic party present itself as efficient managers of a generous welfare

state, and as the political agent of public sector unions."(42) He also contends that in the long run, breaking ties with labour "...would benefit the NDP and unions, at least private sector unions."(43) Richards argument, however, is flawed because it assumes that deficit fighting equals cutting public sector workers, a sentiment which is not shared by all New Democrats.

Ottawa MP Nelson Riis, for example, contends that although the debt and the deficit is a problem, it is symptom of a deeper problem, that being high unemployment.(44) Riis argues that while the NDP should commit itself to balancing the budget, it should do so lowering interest rates and focusing on job creation. He hopes that the party will continue to cooperate with labour. However, he believes that the party has to change in changing times and hopes that "...labour also changes to reflect these realities."(45)

When asked why the NDP did so poorly in 1993, Ottawa MP Chris Axworthy blamed the party's "out of date, old fashioned vision" for the NDP's failures.(46) He argues that the party had not been in touch with its constituents, preferring instead to fight battles (free trade) already lost.(47) More importantly, he correctly points out that trade unionists do not vote as trade unionists. Consequently, Axworthy believes a political platform which appeals to the rank and file will in the long-run strengthen

NDP-labour relations. When asked whether he supports a deficit fighting strategy Axworthy responded:

> In my mind there is nothing more left-wing than to deal with the deficit. It takes money from the poor to the rich... [it] prevents a government and a society from using its resources for public good and it gives money to foreign bond-holders.(48)

Unlike Nelson Riis, Axworthy insists that if the public sector is overmanned, then he would favour public sector cuts. However, Axworthy points out that such cuts should be made at the upper management levels first (ie. non-union positions).

The way in which NDP-labour relations will evolve ultimately depends on whether or not the two sides share compatible goals. Although the CAW has been an outspoken critic of the NDP, there is evidence which suggests that the two sides are not very far apart. For example, the CAW has outlined a number of social reform objectives:

What Social Reform Should Be...

1) Right to a decent job;
2) Transitional support in the form of income and education/training during temporary unemployment;
3) The removal of barriers to work and training faced by any group (discrimination, disabilities, part-time work, childcare);
4) Adequate income maintenance for those not in the workforce (pensions, single mothers, children, injured workers);
5) Universal services (health, education, childcare).(49)

The goals outlined above are, in fact, not much different than the objectives outlined at the NDP's renewal

conferences.

During the NDP's December 1994 renewal conference, the party's mission panel agreed that its goals were to create a society dedicated to equality, justice and democracy.(50) The panel also agreed that the party's overriding concern was to represent workers and the disadvantaged.(51) Interestingly, the NDP's mission panel also expressed a willingness to participate in extra-parliamentary social coalitions, a strategy already utilized by the CAW and the public sector unions. Specifically, the mission panel states that the party must "work with the widest possible range of organizations, including the labour, feminist and environmental movements, with whom we have something in common philosophically..."(52) Clearly, then, the obstacles which have plagued NDP-labour relations in recent years can be resolved. Both labour and the party share a common belief in helping working people and the disadvantaged in order to create a more egalitarian society. The real test, though, will be whether or not both sides can agree on how to achieve their common goals.

To facilitate a reconciliation between labour and the NDP, structural reform of the party is required. Since the 1930s, CCF-NDP relations with labour have often been tentative and precarious. This is because the NDP's structure makes it difficult for profitable exchanges to occur between labour and the NDP. According to Goldman's

transaction theory, contributions toward an organization are made with the expectation of receiving something in return. Obviously, when the contributor doesn't receive any reward in return the probability of future transactions between the parties diminishes. As well, a lack of trust begins to develop by the disgruntled contributor, thereby increasing the likelihood of conflict. For example, when the NDP government in Ontario passed the Social Contract Act, the CAW and many public sector unions described the government's decision as an act of betrayal. As a result, many labour organizations not only cut their campaign donations to the federal party in 1993, they also refused to support the NDP in Ontario in 1995. Therefore, a new relationship which fosters trust and encourages profitable transactions between the NDP and labour must be created.

As discussed in the introduction of this study, there are three types of political transactions which can occur between two or more parties . First, shares (decisional elements) which refer to an individual's influence within the decision making process of the group. Second, incumbencies (positional elements) used to describe contributions which are made with the expectation of personal reward. Third, commodities (materiel elements) which characterizes the exchange of materials (ie. money) as an instrument for achieving an individual's goals. According to Goldman's transaction theory, when profitable

transactions occur cooperation and trust between parties are enhanced. The remainder of this chapter, therefore, aims to construct a new structural model for the NDP which, amongst other things, encourages profitable transactions between it and labour to occur.

Throughout this study the NDP has been described as an integrated party because, with the exception of Quebec, there is no clear distinction between its provincial and federal wings. The NDP is also a mass party. The major aim of a mass party is to have a large and active membership.(53) Canada's two traditional parties, by contrast, have been described as confederal in structure. In other words, the provincial wings operate separately from the federal party. Canada's two traditional parties are also defined as cadre parties. Unlike mass parties , cadre parties do not require their members to belong exclusively to their party. Moreover, the very concept of membership in a cadre party is informal and important only for electoral mobilization.(54) Whereas the organizational structure of the traditional parties have led to success, the NDP's organizational structure has been one of the party's main weaknesses.

For the federal NDP, its integrated structure has meant that it has often been criticized for the conduct of provincial NDP governments. For example, during the 1993 federal election campaign, various labour organizations

announced that they were cutting their financial contributions to the federal party because of the Social Contract Act passed by the NDP government in Ontario. The confederal structure of the Liberals and the Conservatives, however, have spared them, to a large extent, from this problem. Under the leadership of Robert Bourassa, for instance, the Liberal Party of Quebec won two consecutive majority governments even though the federal Liberals fared poorly in Quebec during the same period. In Manitoba, Gary Filmon's Conservative Party was able to win its first majority government despite the unpopularity of the Conservative government in Ottawa.

The integrated model has also made it extremely difficult for the federal NDP to communicate with labour and other social coalition groups. Originally the party's founders believed that the integrated model would ensure that the NDP would be a centralized party. However, as Canada's provincial bureaucracies grew to accommodate the growing numbers of new government programs, provincial governments and the parties which formed them grew substantially. Consequently, the formation of NDP governments in Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Manitoba and Ontario shifted power and prestige from the federal party to its provincial wings. For the NDP, then, the decentralizing pressures of Canadian federalism have made it increasingly difficult for the NDP to function as an integrated

party.(55) Furthermore, because the party's membership lists are in the hands of its provincial wings, the federal NDP does not even know who its members are. In short, the federal NDP has lost direct access to its members within the labour movement, its constituency associations, and other social coalition groups.

The process of delegate selection for its conventions has also strengthened the NDP's provincial wings at the expense of the federal party. The majority of convention delegates come from constituency associations that, with the exception of Quebec, are shared with the provincial party.(56) Thus the voting behaviour of convention delegates, whether it is choosing a leader or changing the party's program, is often determined by provincial loyalties. As well, the NDP's Federal Council, which is responsible for governing the party between conventions, is dominated by provincial party table officers and members selected from provincial party conventions.(57) Additionally, although affiliated unions usually comprise approximately 20 percent of convention delegates, their representation on Federal Council is only 10-12 percent.(58)

The NDP's organizational structure has also made it difficult for the federal party to formulate and articulate a coherent political program. Political differences between the NDP's provincial wings are reflective of the regional and economic diversity of Canada. The political dynamics of

Saskatchewan, for instance, are different than those of Ontario. According to Terry Morley: "The ambivalent language of convention resolutions reflected the ambiguous and diverse impulses among New Democrats."(59) Furthermore, as discussed in chapter two, the party's Strategy and Election Planning Committee (SEPC) had swelled to an unmanageable number of 50 members by 1993. Its size rendered the SEPC ineffective because it was difficult to please everyone on the committee. Instead of cooperation there was serious infighting and confusion amongst SEPC members. For example, when the NDP's communications officer Michael Balagus and SEPC chair Julie Davis had NDP campaign plans printed in the *Ottawa Citizen* the CLC's Carol Phillips wrote to Balagus, "Give me a break. We must've been at different meetings..."(60) Therefore, it is obvious how the rules and methods used to formulate its policies dramatically reduced the NDP's ability create a credible political platform in 1993.

What structural changes should the NDP implement? The answer to this question may be found, in part, by examining other social democratic parties. The electorally successful ALP, for example, may offer some answers. Similarly to the NDP, the ALP has historically been frustrated by federalism.(61) However, unlike the NDP, the ALP has made two key structural changes. First, during the 1980s the national ALP steadily separated itself from its state

branches, and second, the ALP established a new method for organizing delegates based upon cross state factional alliances.(62) The newly legitimized factions were allowed to have their own rules for membership, their own constitutions and their own fee structures within the ALP.(63) By permitting factions into the party , the ALP has in effect created a party which encourages discussion between various groups and has shifted the very nature of intra-party debate from regional based concerns to cross state matters. Howard Pawley, moreover, points out that Australia's trade unions participate in either right or left factions.(64) For the NDP, allowing labour organizations to participate in various factions would be extremely valuable. It would finally recognize the fact that labour is not a monolithic entity nor do labour leaders and their rank and file members share the same political views.

Allowing factions into the NDP would also recognize the fact that labour's role within the party is that of both a partner and an interest group. This is because factions would be permitted to have their own conventions and their own constitutions while also holding membership with the NDP. As well, factional representatives would be permitted to attend party conventions and participate in the NDP's major decision-making bodies. In other words, the relative autonomy afforded to the factions would allow labour representatives to voice their concerns freely and without

fear of expulsion from the party.

Before suggesting, however, that the NDP should model itself after the ALP, it is important to note that there are problems associated with factionalism as it exists within the ALP. The pre-selection of party candidates, for instance, has become increasingly dominated by factional considerations, rather than determined by the qualifications of the candidates .(65) As well, there has been a certain degree of resentment over the role played by the factions amongst party members who are not involved in factions.(66) Finally, when in government the ALP's Cabinet selection process has been mainly determined by factional representation within the party's caucus. Therefore, while the admission of factions into the NDP should be considered, safeguards must also be made in order to prevent factional domination. Representation at NDP conventions and on Federal Council, for example, would be pre-set to ensure the numerical supremacy of delegates chosen from the party's constituency associations. In the future, maintaining the representational supremacy of the constituency associations is essential if the NDP hopes to balance the interests of its grass roots supporters with the interests of labour and other groups.

Although NDP constituency associations would continue to enjoy representational supremacy, their role within the decision-making process would be reformed. Historically it

has been the constituency association which has formulated resolutions which were intended to be debated at party conventions. Unfortunately, this has meant that NDP conventions have traditionally been flooded with a wide array, and sometimes conflicting, set of proposals. This, in turn, has made difficult for the party's Resolutions Committee to decide which proposals are to be considered and which proposals are discarded. This process, then, has not only angered those constituency associations which have seen their resolutions abandoned, it has also made it difficult for the NDP to devise a coherent political program.

The NDP must therefore change the rules which have dictated how party policy is developed. Instead of allowing various local ridings the authority to devise and present resolutions, the NDP could create a few large regional policy making bodies divided in the following manner: 1) Western region (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia); Central Region (Ontario and Quebec); and 3) Eastern Region (including all the Maritime provinces). One elected member from each constituency association would be part of these regional bodies. The duty of these members would be to formulate a limited (5 minimum/10 maximum) number of policy proposals which would then be voted by their respective constituency associations. Only those resolutions accepted by the constituency associations would be presented to the SEPC at the party's convention. The

SEPC would then be required to develop a political platform for the party.

The SEPC, for its part, would be dramatically reduced in size. Representation on the SEPC would include the party's leader, its president, one member from each regional decision making body (total - 3), two factional representatives and 2 representatives from affiliated union locals. Although required to devise a political platform from the resolutions passed by the regional policy making bodies, the SEPC would also be permitted to develop its own policies. Moreover, elections would be held yearly for all SEPC members, except for the party's leader, and its president, to ensure a sufficient degree of accountability.

Obviously, then, there are many ways in which NDP-labour relations can be improved in fashion which would also help the NDP's electoral competitiveness. First, the NDP should become a confederal party. An independent federal party equipped with its own constituency associations would ensure that its members' loyalties lay exclusively with it. Labour organizations as well as their members would, for the first time, have direct access to the federal party. As well, labour organizations would also have the option of either joining as an affiliated union or within a recognized faction. The introduction of factions would minimize intra-party conflict on the basis of regional allegiances while creating an atmosphere which encourages open debate.

Why would labour unions join this new federal party? They would join because some of the void left by provincial wing delegates would be filled by labour delegates thereby giving it a greater voice within the federal party. Specifically, union representation on the Federal Council (10-12 percent under the party's present structure) would be raised in accordance with the number of union delegates participating at NDP conventions (currently 20-25 percent). Labour organizations which choose to join a faction with other individuals and coalition groups would also have representation on Federal Council and delegate representation at party conventions. By increasing labour's presence in the decision making process, the probability for profitable exchanges to occur between the NDP and labour would increase greatly.

By implementing all of these proposed structural changes the NDP will not only have a larger coalition of supporters, it will also have a larger and loyal grass roots following. The federal NDP will then be able to formulate a credible and electorally competitive political platform which balances the interests of labour with other groups and individuals.

Conclusion

Since the 1993 federal election campaign, NDP-labour relations have been precarious. The CAW and most public

sector unions have sought alternatives to the NDP, as a way to better serve labour's interests. By contrast, private sector unions have remained loyal to the NDP. Within the NDP there are also divisions with regard to labour's worth as a political ally. Although it is difficult to speculate how the NDP-labour relationship will unfold, it is clear that neither side has little to gain from a divorce.

The NDP remains as the only political party which represents labour's interests. Even in Ontario, where the public sector unions and the CAW refused to endorse the party, the Rae government passed Bill 40, employment equity, and pay equity. Similarly, in British Columbia, the Harcourt government implemented numerous pro-labour measures. In Saskatchewan, Romanow's NDP government successfully balanced the province's budget without the massive public sector layoffs or deep cuts in social services which occurred in neighbouring Alberta.

Ultimately, it will be up to the CAW and most of the public sector unions currently disillusioned by the NDP to make a number of important decisions. They must decide whether or not they are prepared to better reflect the political views of their members. Moreover, they will have to decide whether or not participating in extra-parliamentary social coalitions will better serve their interests than by aligning themselves with the NDP.

As for the NDP, it must restructure itself in a manner

which conforms to the realities of Canadian federalism. The NDP must also allow for factions to exist within it. As well, increased union representation on Federal Council should reflect union representation on the convention floor. Enhanced labour participation at all levels of the federal party would encourage profitable transactions and consequently greater NDP-labour cooperation. If the NDP follows this direction it can emerge as a significant political force more capable of challenging the country's other major parties.

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CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION

The previous chapters have clearly shown that the tensions between the NDP and labour have been detrimental to the interests of both organizations. It has also been concluded that in order to improve its electoral fortunes, as well as its relationship with labour, the NDP must be willing to implement a number of structural changes. Prior to discussing these proposed structural changes, a brief reiteration of the key factors which have shaped NDP-labour relations in the 1990s is necessary.

NDP-Labour Relations: 1990-1995

In 1989, the NDP chose Audrey McLaughlin as its leader. Although McLaughlin had limited political experience, her commitment to social policy issues pleased many labour leaders. In fact, during the leadership convention McLaughlin was supported by some of the largest and most influential labour leaders including, Leo Gerard of the Steelworkers, Bob White from the CAW (now president of the CLC), CUPE's president Jeff Rose, and Gordon Wilson from the OFL.(1) With McLaughlin as the federal party's leader it appeared as though NDP-labour relations were about to enter into a new and more productive era.

The relationship between the NDP and labour, however, soured in 1993 because of the actions taken by Ontario's NDP government. The Rae government in Ontario had grossly

underestimated the recession of the early 1990s. The Ontario government, faced with shrinking revenues, soon found itself plagued with massive budgetary deficits and a skyrocketing debt. Ontario's fiscal situation became so serious that the government decided to negotiate a social contract with public sector unions in an attempt to control spending. After failing to reach an agreement with public sector union leaders, the Rae government legislated a unilateral roll-back of existing collective agreements. In response, public sector union leaders, along with the country's largest private sector union, the CAW, condemned the social contract because it infringed on collective bargaining rights. The fact that this legislation was passed by the NDP made it only more difficult for many labour leaders to comprehend because many trade unionists felt betrayed by an NDP government which they had helped to elect in 1990.

Unfortunately for the federal NDP, the rift between the labour and the Rae government unfolded during a federal election year. Indeed, the majority of Canada's labour organizations supported the federal party. However, labour's support for the NDP in 1993 lacked the enthusiasm and the dollars associated with past federal election campaigns. This is because as an integrated party the majority of the Federal Party's campaign staff, including campaign advisors, came from its provincial wings. As a

result, many of Ontario's labour organizations found it difficult to enthusiastically support the federal NDP because of the actions taken by one of its provincial wings. Furthermore, the Federal Party's apparent reluctance to speak out against Rae's social contract further dismayed the NDP's labour allies. In fact, when New Democrat MP Steven Langdon decided to publicly condemn the social contract, he was subsequently stripped of his duties as the party's finance critic for his comments.

On election night, October 25th 1993, the NDP received a mere 6.9 percent of the popular vote and only nine seats. In Ontario, the party lost all ten of the seats that it had won in 1988. In the West, moreover, the Reform Party successfully defeated many of the NDP's incumbents. The serious decline of the NDP has forced the party and its traditional labour allies to re-examine their relationship with one another. This study has attempted to identify the problems which have caused NDP-labour relations. As well, this study has presented possible solutions to these problems which would, in effect, increase labour's role within the NDP.

NDP-Labour Relations: A New Partnership

Establishing an alternative set of rules which enhances the effectiveness of NDP-labour relations requires structural change. In accordance with Goldman's transaction

theory, it was concluded that an environment which encourages profitable transactions between labour and the NDP must be created. In order to create an environment which encourages profitable transactions to occur labour's participation in the decision making process of the NDP must be increased. It was argued that the labour's representation on the Federal Council be increased to reflect the number of labour delegates which attend the party's conventions. More importantly, it was argued that labour's presence be increased within a smaller, and more powerful, Strategy and Election Planning Committee.

Furthermore, the NDP would have to become a confederal party. This would enable the party, for the first time, to have a direct link with labour and its other supporters. Moreover, by becoming a confederal party, the NDP would have its own federal constituency associations and access to membership lists. More importantly, by having its own constituency associations, the federal NDP would have a membership loyal to it, rather than a membership which is divided by provincial loyalties.

As a confederal party, the NDP would be financially independent from its provincial wings. With its own membership lists it could solicit its supporters directly for funds. Moreover, for the first time, the Federal Party could fully benefit from the rules of the *Elections Expenses Act*, which allows federal parties to issue tax exemption

receipts for political donations.

Finally, the NDP should also allow for factions to be admitted into the party. Allowing factions into the NDP, would encourage open debate on important and sometimes controversial issues. It would also allow another avenue for social coalition groups and labour organizations to participate in the NDP. In short, the removal of the provincial presence, combined with the admission of factions into the NDP, would encourage and enhance the party's ability to formulate a credible national program.

Clearly, then, the proposed structural changes are intended to maximize the potential benefits associated with NDP-labour ties. More significantly, the proposals attempt to accomplish this objective in a manner which will also improve the NDP's electoral chances.

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